recording-subtitles/2021/Surveillance Societies/output.srt

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Hello, everyone. Thank you for joining this session. We are now welcoming Viktor, who is

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a privacy activist, researcher and writer. He is the head of communications at IPPN and

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the founder of the Privacy Issue, an editorial platform. Today he will be elaborating some

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spicy questions about surveillance. Let's hear Viktor for more.

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Hello. Thanks for the intro. Hi, everyone. As Silva said, my name is Viktor. I'm a privacy

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researcher from Hungary. I've been a PIVIC and Matomo user for close to 10 years now,

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so I'm really excited to be here. I would like to kick off this talk with a quote about the question

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of technological determinism, the question of do we have an agency over the effect of new technology?

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And Lynn White Jr. said, technology merely opens the door. It does not compare one to enter.

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And for this gentleman called Marvin Kranzeberg said, true, we are not

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compelled to enter White's open door. But an open door is an invitation. Besides,

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who decides which doors to open? And are not our future directions guided by the chamber into

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which we have stepped? Equally important, once we have crossed the threshold, can we turn back?

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So just to give you a little bit of context about why I'm really motivated to give this talk.

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I've been at IPPN for three years now, and we've been talking and thinking and discussing the

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topic of privacy quite a lot internally and within communities and with customers. And the question

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regularly comes up, why does it matter? Why privacy matters? What is this end state that we

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would like to protect ourselves against? And there are many theoretical, philosophical,

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historical and legal answers to this. But what I would like to explore today is like,

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if we would be living in a surveillance state or we are headed to a surveillance state,

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how it will all go down? Would we notice it? And to explore this, I will talk about technological

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adoptions, surveillance and its relationship with power, and slippery slopes. So to get started,

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I would like to talk a little bit about privacy and surveillance and some definitions.

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There are many possible ways to define these terms. But for me, the best one for privacy is

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that it's the ability to selectively reveal ourselves to others. And this is universally

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applicable, and it depends on different contexts and relationship and the parties involved. But

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ultimately, it's about giving you autonomy and having agency over our own actions and thoughts.

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So they can be used to judge us and nudge us, and it gives us a unique character. So surveillance,

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for me, is a method of encroaching on that privacy. And this creates an interesting

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dynamic that the surveyor knows more about us than we know about them. The surveyor knows

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what it knows, what they know, and they can define the rules of the game and the capabilities and

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what information to collect. So in this sense, they have an advantage over us. So I think these

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methodologies have evolved way beyond the 80s movies, like people following you around in vans

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and rifle mics and all this kind of stuff. These capabilities have exploded. They are massive.

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And the actors who are doing this have their own reasons for not revealing these. So on the state

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side, when the state's doing surveillance, they usually have secret committees, secret decision

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making, and obfuscation, as we'll see in examples. And on the corporate side, on the corporate

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surveillance side, it's made available by the market, the open market, the last of our approach

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and the lagging regulations. So why this is very important for me is I think privacy is power.

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That's the core of the issue for me. Because if there is surveillance, that means there is a

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lack of privacy, and you lose that power. Because information about you can be used against you,

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and that creates this power imbalance. And this power can be used for control in the name of

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national security and the interest of the people. And it can be used for profit in the name of

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progress and convenience. And this power can manifest in many different ways. And one way is

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the soft power, where there is maybe not a very clear way of this happening. Maybe it's just like

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a softer nudges and influence and giving benefits and rewards and taking away some benefits.

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But on the other end of the spectrum, there's this hard power, which is taking away the freedoms and

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jails and camps. And both can be exerted on citizens and customers. So exploring soft power

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a little bit. The clearest example for me of this soft power on the state side is the social credit

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system in China. Many of you, most of you probably heard about it, but I'm going to give you an

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overview. So in China, surveillance and AI is used for control, for rewards and benefits, and some,

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let's say, softer punishments. And it's important to note that these Chinese social credit systems,

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there is no centralized ubiquitous system where everyone is controlled everywhere and there is

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one all-seeing guy. These systems are tested in a decentralized fashion in different areas

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with various rules. And just to give you an overview, I'd like to show this clip.

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This is from a French movie that the French friends watching this stream might have seen it.

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7 billion suspects. And they've sourced the clip from the Chinese TV on the social credit system.

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This is a one-minute clip about this introduction. So I'd like to show you this. I hope it's going to

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show all right.

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So, feel free to launch it. I think that's an interesting take on this whole thing. You see,

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it's like there's this cartoonish, easygoing introduction to this. But I would argue that

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this is probably not so much fun, especially for the people on this discredited backlist.

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Although it's important to note that, you know, to make this happen, there is a lot of things

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happening on the technological side, facial recognition systems, data from different

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applications, payment system, banking information, police records. All this data is fed into an AI

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to make decisions and give discourse. And many people in China like it, as per the reports and

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what we know about this. There's some clear benefits. You know, your latte in the morning

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might arrive earlier, or you don't have to put down a deposit to rent a car. Great. But on the

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other end, you know, the people punished by the systems are pushed out to the edges. They become

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biased. There is a small chance for rehabilitation. And there is a serious chilling effect on what you

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can do and how far you can push the edges of the system. And when I was researching this whole

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topic, I was interested in the question of how is this all possible in China? And I encountered one

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concept. I think it's really important to describe here. It's the concept of legalism or Faji,

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which says that there is a cost and benefit approach to applying the laws in China. Not

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everyone is equal in the eye of the law. And the party and the leader decides what is good for

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society. And laws can be bent and applied selectively and unchallenged to be used for

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their end. There's not a lot of democratic input. And this is framed as like an extrapolation of

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the existing laws. We are doing it for you. We are doing it for the betterment of societies.

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And all this soft power is exerted because it's for the people. But ultimately, there's one person,

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you know, and he charges to make these decisions, decide, like, what's a good behavior? Like,

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we will tell you how to behave. And you might have a chance, you know, to decide whether you

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comply. But ultimately, you cannot make this choice. And I think, you know, the thinking

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behind this is opposite to the liberal social values that I personally think is better for

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democracies and the advancement of free ideas. So after exploring this soft

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power part on the state side, I would like to move on to the corporate side and what's happening

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there. As you might know from reports and analysis over the years, like, on the corporate side,

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these surveillance-based business models, especially by Facebook and Google, these have

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created enormous power and wealth for them, trillions of dollars in market capitalization.

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So as we move into the direction of spending more time online, especially after these COVID

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dynamics, shaking things up, spending more time online, doing work online, meeting friends and

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family online, leisure time, there is more and more data generated. And now we have seen these

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reports coming out of the vision of Mark Zuckerberg changing the company name to Meta to build this

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Metaverse. This part of the talk, I've prepared for a couple of months now. And

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these news that they are renaming the companies is pretty fresh, but it lines up really well with

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the things that I wanted to share about this, is that in these Metaverse, these real-world dynamics

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are recreated with their own boundaries and own rules. And people are going to be spending a lot

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more time there. And we can argue about different aspects, whether it's good for society and what

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are the downsides. But for me, this surveillance aspect is what's really interesting.

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In this context, because so far they had the power to sell our attention and

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not just into ways the algorithm sinks, it's best for engagement and the highest bidder,

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but it was kind of confined into that space. But in the Metaverse, Facebook is going to own

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the entire stack, the hardware gateways, the payments, the commerce, social graphs, messaging,

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and this creates an option for this aggregated ID system. And what Mark Zuckerberg thinks about

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Facebook, they have to re-transform it into something like the state, because they will

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have to write the rules of the engagement and the behavior, and they have to kind of do some sort of

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police work. And to show you, he already thinks along these lines, because when he was asked

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recently about misinformation and moderation and content policy on Facebook, he said that

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when you think about the integrity of a system like this, it's a little bit like fighting crime

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in a city. No one expects you that you're ever going to fully solve it, but the police will

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have to do a good enough job of helping to deter and catch the bad thing when it happens. So

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right now on Facebook, this is kind of like encapsulated, but in the Metaverse, this is

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going to be a much more important question. And in this context, there is no need for Fagi or legalism.

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Let's just lose regulations and the opportunity for one person to make these kind of decisions

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and say who and why is rewarded, what is acceptable, and this will be closed systemated

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by constant surveillance. So I just want to note here without trying to pass any big judgments here

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that Black Mirror series was not an operating manual. So maybe this is something to think

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about for people working on this stuff. Okay, so after exploring the soft power, I would like

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to move on to hard power, like the more egregious and scary violations on privacy and the examples

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where surveillance is used to exert hard power on populations. We have seen this before in history.

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You know, we know this from the history books. Oppressive states, authoritarian leaders,

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xenophobia, you know, feeling into this. But what's happening now, and this is also something that

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was widely reported and I hope you've heard about it, this is happening now in China, in the province

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of Xinjiang, where at least tens of thousands of Uyghurs are put into these re-education camps,

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which are actually concentration camps, because there is evidence of violence and coercion. So

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they are put into these camps because of their religion, mainly, because they are not conforming

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with the idea of how Chinese people should behave. And they have not seen a lawyer, they were not

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convicted. And, you know, these tens of thousands is just the confirmed numbers, you know, activists

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and researchers say it's probably in the hundreds of thousands. So all this project was carried out

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with the help of surveillance technology, facial recognition, monitoring of communications,

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behavioral data, biometric information, feeding into these data points and feeding into this AI.

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And this system is called IGOP. And like the Chinese secret police use this, and with the

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help of military police, they put QR codes on houses, monitor people, set up checkpoints. And

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this algorithm actually makes the decision of who is this, who are the subversive elements and who

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pose the biggest risk and they are sent into these camps. So this example is the most chilling

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example of use of surveillance technology. But I want to make the point here that this same logic

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applies as with the soft power, you know, separate the good and bad, use the data and use these kind

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of AI systems and these kind of methodologies for the same purpose. So data and tech, we can say

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it's neutral and it's benign, but it can be introduced and scaled and tested and repurposed

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for more sinister end. This actually happened in China. So to conclude this part, I would like to

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talk a little bit about the outsourcing of surveillance, because I've talked about this

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parallel of state and corporate application of these technologies. It's good to note here that

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they have similar motivations and they have an interest in working together. And there is big

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money to be made in surveillance on the private side. And some of the examples here, LexisNexis

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is a data broker, mainly operating in the U.S. but there are other areas as well.

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They have 10,000 data points on hundreds of millions of people collecting it from different

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sources, location, information, license plate data, and different other stuff. And this is all used by

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law enforcement in the U.S. Another example is the Clearview AI, who build these big facial recognition

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database systems and they use it from, and they do it with the help of public and private sources.

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So this is the part where the data collection part is outsourced to private companies. But

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there's also the next step, which is the making sense of the data. And Palantir is an excellent

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example here. We are going to see some examples from the U.S. and some other areas as well.

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Palantir is a data analytics company worth 50 billion now in U.S. dollars, give or take,

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and dozens of states around the world use it. In the U.S., they deploy so-called fusion centers

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where they help with the LAPD uses this and New Orleans Police uses this. They help with the

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comprehension and this kind of like predictive policing system. And they use the state databases

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and private databases, what we've seen before, and aggregate all this data to make sense of

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what is happening. And it's called GADM. That might give you an indication of what they think

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about the whole city and the crime there. So anyone can look at anyone in there who have

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access to the system. But for example, in L.A., half of all the police officers have access to

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the system and they look at anyone. And they've also used this like chronic offender test there

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where they give like points to people in the system to identify who is likely to be offended.

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And they also list like nonviolent offenders and non-suspects and persons of interest,

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people who are in different areas getting that kind of like geofenced information from them.

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So this really feeds into the idea of everyone can become a suspect. So, yeah, this is about

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the outsourcing of the surveillance. So now I've given you kind of like an overview of what's

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happening and some of the capabilities. Just moving back to the question of the title of the

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talk, are we there yet? I think in some places we are definitely there. It depends on where you live

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and who you are. And to help you determine at your place whether you are there yet,

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it's important to, I think, to talk about the concept of slippery slopes. So the slippery

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slope argument is that when we take one small step in a specific direction, it can have a snowball

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or domino effect. It can have dire outcomes. And this question came up with the questions of

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Apple's deployment of client-side scanning for child exploitation images when they scan your

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iPhone if you are synced to iCloud and check against these hashes. Now, the technical details

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are more complex than I could get into in this timeframe. But the point here is that privacy

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advocates and researchers and information security professionals warned that this whole thing can

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make us end up in a bad place. And it will lead to more privacy issues. It will lead to more

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surveillance. It will give capabilities to authoritarian governments. And a lot of people

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are eager to jump in, like, OK, come on. Don't use the slippery slope argument. That's a fallacy.

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And that won't happen. If you enable iCloud, you're not going to end up in a concentration camp.

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That's just silly. But my argument here is that that's not what privacy advocates are saying.

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I think the slippery slope argument is only a fallacy if the steps following each other would

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not lead to the proposed outcome. And we cannot demonstrate that. But the inference of these steps

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is warranted after careful evaluation of these steps. Then we can agree and we can agree

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objectively about these steps. And then it's a valid argument. And it's not a threat.

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It's a threat. And it's not a fallacy. So it's valid to talk about these things.

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And what we've seen in China as a possible end state, it's not an imaginary situation.

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We can easily get there if there are different steps to happen. And for this part of the talk,

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I wanted to create this thought experiment, how this slippery surveillance slope would look like.

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Well, that's a tongue twister. So there are six steps that I've identified. And we are going to

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look at them and how they happen in different countries now. So first, that data about citizens

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is abundant. I think this is given in most areas of the world now. Both in the state and on the

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corporate side and the sharing on these two ends. And then the second step on the slope is targeted

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surveillance and easy and normalized. So hacking into people's accounts, giving a lot of legal

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space for that, getting around different legal protections, getting stuff without obtaining

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warrants. So we'll see an example in the next part and example from Hungary, where I'm from.

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And so this is the next step I've identified. And the third one is that the state increases

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the scope without any kind of pushback. So after this targeted surveillance is easy and normalized,

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after this targeted surveillance is easy and normalized, and we can see there is no oversight,

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there is a lot of dodging questions, and there is more data points, and there is more information

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to be had, they start to build these systems. So I think in some of the states, we definitely

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know about the Snowden revelations. It's happened already there. China is definitely there. In the

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EU, I think some of the countries are moving into this direction, as we're going to explore

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a little bit later. So this is the third step. This is moving into this dragnet and mass surveillance

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and using that for different purposes. And then a fourth step is very important here,

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is the interventions due to political need. So when there is like this loosening grip on power

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or that there is this challenge from civil society, from journalists, there is this part

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where this data is actually getting used. And then as a fifth step, you can become the subject of

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surveillance. And the first step, only the journalists and only the opposition party members

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and people of interest in that kind of groups. But then it's very easy to say that, okay,

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so we don't want any kind of gay propaganda going on here. There are some voices sounding that in

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different parts of the world, like in Hungary. So it's very easy to move to that direction.

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We need to create this list and we need to survey more and more people. And the sixth step,

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you can be discriminated. Your rights can be denied and you can end up in confinement or worse,

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depending on the legal protections that you have or how much your state want to honor them.

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And so going back to this normalizing surveillance part, I think it's very instructive,

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like what happened in Hungary about the Pegasus scandal. If you haven't heard about that,

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Pegasus is a spyware. It can be installed on phones. It's pretty costly and it's very targeted.

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And in Hungary, we had this leak where it involved many other countries as well. Not just Hungary,

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but in Hungary, there were at least a hundred people on this list. And in some cases, at least

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10 cases, it was demonstrated that these phones have actually been hacked. But on the list,

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there was opposition politicians, lawyers, investigative journalists. And this whole thing

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came out in July and there were no clear answers. There was no admittance, like who have done this,

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why they have done this, why it was a good idea. There was always just obfuscation. And finally,

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yesterday, after a couple of months, the Hungarian government admitted it. Yes,

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we have purchased the software. But still, the line is that we have done everything legally.

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Yeah, of course. I mean, the laws are written in a way to help states like ours get away with

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this kind of surveillance and normalize this surveillance. And they can use this for their

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own ends and goals to get the grip on power and sustain that power. And a very interesting line

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from yesterday is that the person, the government officials who were announcing this for journalists

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said, it's OK, because tech giants do more spying than the state. And he went on to talk about how

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law-moner ads follow their friends around and stuff like that. Well, of course, that's a valid

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point in itself, but not when you want to escape accountability and hide your own actions. It's

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moving this whole conversation away from that. So yeah, so just thinking a little bit about

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giving you an overview about what's happening with the adoption of these technologies. That's the

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next section I want to talk about. It's important to note that many countries, China especially,

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but even some of the European surveillance tech, is getting exported into other countries. China,

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that's if you put it in your favorite search engine, which is, I really hope it's not Google,

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China surveillance technology plus a country, you can play this game and many countries will end up

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with some reports of China trying to push their surveillance tech to them. Ecuador, Chile, and many

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African countries cooperate with them. And they use this to legitimize their whole reasoning.

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It works here. It will work for you. Look at all this success. And they want to make money off of

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it, of course, and this whole technological dominance. But this is not the end of the story.

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I mean, most of the EU countries, we have some cooperation with the Chinese, but I think it's

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getting a little bit more like a hot topic. So some of the states are pulling back. But

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in terms of cooperating with companies like Preview AI or Palantir that I've talked about,

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there is a lot of things going on. So like in the EU, Palantir is partnered with Europol,

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French intelligence services, Danish national police, and other countries. And like the Dutch,

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authorities have revealed that they are holding more than 45,000 documents relating to Palantir

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and their cooperation, but they don't show these. And Danish police have refused freedom of

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information requests on these documents. Europol reportedly have 69 documents, but they refused

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access to almost all of them on the grounds of public security. So you can see there is

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this obfuscation going on in these areas as well. And one other crazy story about Preview AI and

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this facial recognition databases is from Finland. Like Buzzfeed, a journalist went and explored

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these leaks about who is using Preview AI and who's testing it. And Swedish police have tested it

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and French Ministry of Interior have tested it. And they went to a Finnish government official

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and asked them, okay, so have you used it? Because we have some conflicting reports here. And the

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Finnish official said like, we don't know what Preview AI is. But then after this conversation,

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they researched it and have started testing it. So yeah, so this is the downside of awareness,

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I guess. So moving on and thinking about these adoptions and putting it a little bit into like

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this long-term and historical perspective and this longer term trajectory. I would like to

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show you this framework by Carlotta Perez, a scholar who is researching technological revolutions.

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And this is about this technology search cycle. And she says that there are two phases of these

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revolutions, the installation period and the deployment period. And these general purpose

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technologies, last time it happened with the car and oil and mass production in the early 20th

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century, there is this first phase where there is this rapid testing and creative destruction

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and new paradigms coming and there is a cultural shift. Industries collapsed, loss of jobs,

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wealth inequality, and there's usually a financial bubble. And this creates a lot of disillusionment,

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this creates a lot of chaos. And then in the last time this happened, there were these wars and

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like Hitler happened. So I'm not saying that's going to happen again. But what Ms. Perez is

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saying right now, she has explored this in the current context with the computer and information

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technology, energy, clean energy revolution, nanotech and biotech. She argues that we are

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somewhat halfway there. So we had some bubbles now and we had some crisis, like two bigger

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crises in the past 20 years. But she says that we are still in this turning point. And why it's

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important in this context is because it brings a lot of disillusioned people and it creates a lot

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of upheaval. And this creates an opening for messianic type of authoritarian leaders,

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just like it happens in the 30s, who come in and offer a direction, offer a solution,

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I will tell you and I will help you to make sense of this work. And my argument here is that

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surveillance helps them a great deal to create this kind of stability and order. And we can argue,

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if you look at what's happening in China, they're already in this synergy phase. There was enormous

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growth based on all these technologies in the past 5-10 years. And it came together with the

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rapid deployment of surveillance. So this golden age that comes with this deployment period,

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just like it happened after the wars, it might come with a big surveillance for us.

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So we bring it all together. I think we are in this moment where it's ripe for this rapid

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and wide adoption of surveillance technologies. And if you think about this long-term trajectory,

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there could be new capabilities and really hocus-pocus growth of adoption like we see

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with other technologies. And I think we are not at the point of this sci-fi, all-seeing guy,

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everyone is monitored all the time in real time, but it's possible. And we can really get there.

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It might take 5 years, 10 years. It might happen in China first. But if there is success there,

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which can be emulated, it's without legislation, without awareness, without pushback from people

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like us, there might be more progress towards that area. So all this makes me want to make

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a couple of points. First is like autocratic states love surveillance, so we love surveillance.

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They benefit a lot from these technologies and the framing of the security and betterment

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of societies. And I would expect to see more of this against the others, migrants, subversive

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elements. And this whole security incentives and this whole national security drum can be beaten

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and say that we will sway the public opinion towards this surveillance being a good thing for

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you. And the next question for me is, who can push the button tomorrow? Who are going to be the

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future rulers? Yuval Harari, writer and thinker, recently noted that perhaps a future autocrat is

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going to be an Instagram star and not a Bond villain. They will use these technologies in a

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very methodical way. They will know all the ins and outs. And also they will know a lot about

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branding and propaganda. And who will be their advisors? Who will make these kind of decisions?

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I think these questions are not asked enough. And right now we are in this phase where there is this

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veil of fake accountability and leader knows best rhetoric of one party state. This is creeping

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into our democracies. And the question also comes like what is lost? And I think the open societies

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right to self-determination, freedom to experiment and human rights equally to all and religious

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freedoms, these are all under attack. And I think in liberal democracies, these values are given

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and often fought for. And privacy helps these values. But surveillance has a chilling effect on

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them. And I think this whole question is a defining topic in our lives. And a push away from these

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can support increased surveillance, strengthening autocratic systems and help new autocrats come

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into power will be harder to challenge. And last question before we are wrapping up, who benefits?

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This hunger for information and more data and creation of more data points is kind of endless

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now because of its value. It has been demonstrated and tested for this power. And the trust in

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governments and corporations are eroding. All the measurements and all the service shows that.

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And to rebuild that, if you want to rebuild that, we need to have awareness and oversight

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and transparency and accountability from state and corporations. And there has to be some sort of a

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real democratic process to decide from citizens and customers, not just a black box and like

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obfuscating everything in the name of security. So ultimately, if you want to ask for the question

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of the title of the talk, I think you have to decide. Now you have some view, you have some

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frameworks, and you have some ideas about my thinking about this. But you have to decide for

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yourself, how deep is this slippery slope? Where does it lead? How far we are on it? You might

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disagree with some of my conclusions. But what I know is that without these checks and

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balances and the ability and willingness to understand and oppose these changes,

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we are going to get pushed down on these slopes by others. So I have a short plea to you. If you

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agree with me about these values and these questions and threats, please don't work on

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surveillance technologies and these capabilities to deploy them for control and creating these

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power imbalances. Palantir is looking for a lot of people in a lot of European countries.

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You know, so that's something that I would argue for you and others to not take that step. But

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maybe we'll end up with the finished preview example and someone will start working for

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Palantir after this. Yeah, I hope that's not gonna happen. So what you can do instead is working on

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giving power to the people and like with building encryption, privacy preserving software, activism,

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education. And together, we can envision new models of governance and new business models.

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And since you are here at Matomo can be watching this talk, you might already do some of this work

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and I really applaud you. And I would like to, you know, ask you to keep doing that. I'm more

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than happy to help you and be a partner in that. And together, we can support the public to conduct

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their affairs in private, communicate in private, and do all this without the undue and unjust

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surveillance. So before we part, I would like to finish with the the other end of this quote

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from Malin Kranzberg that we have started with. He says that technology is neither good nor bad,

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nor is it neutral. Many of our technology related problems arise because of the unforeseen

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consequences when apparently benign technologies are employed on a massive scale. As many technical

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applications that seem the boon to mankind when first introduced become threats when they're used

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become widespread. So thank you for your attention. I think we have something like 10 minutes for

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questions. But if there's no way of doing that, you know, you can just email me at

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victor.ivp.net. So I'm happy to talk about any of these topics and help you with research or anything else.

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I have shared some questions in the chat for you, Victor. Okay, I'm just gonna read them out loud

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then and try to answer them. So life like house and money are often two big factors which are

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making people move. According to you, how is it possible for citizens feel more concerned about

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privacy? If I understand the question correctly, it's like perhaps that there are more important

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or more like pressing things on people's lists than than privacy. I think you can connect,

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you know, these topics to privacy, for example. So the health data is exploited as well and states

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are sharing health data. For example, the NHS in the UK is sharing health data with Palantir.

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So if we summarize my talk and its possible outcomes and you connect it with

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these kind of issues of health and money, that's one way to get there. But of course, you know,

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we have this massive hierarchy of needs to think about. So I think if some really have like really

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pressing matters that would prevent them to think about these issues and they don't have the

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options to switch to different other solutions, like using other providers, that are usually more

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costly. So I see that as a challenge. But if there is more awareness, there is more demand,

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there's going to be more solutions that are more private. So I think that's one way to get there.

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Second question, do you have any proof or leak or any other sort of information showing that

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a gay fan can track an individual along the website's apps he's visiting? For example,

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being loaded to Google account and being able to know that this user is visiting a given website

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thanks to tracker with GG funds. Well, I have to tell you that this is not my specific area of

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expertise. So I won't have to get back on you on that about the technical details. But, you know,

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I don't think we need any leaks for this. There's actually, you know, third party trackers. So,

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for example, if you visit sites that have Google Analytics or like a Facebook pixel,

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that immediately analyzes your persona, based on different information, like your IP address,

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and like your screen size and different unique, there is this unique fingerprint,

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and that is passed on to Google and that is passed on to Facebook. And then they are able

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to track you across sites. I think this is pretty well documented. So I hope I understand the

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question well. So yeah, this is happening. If you're concerned about this, you can use

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tracker blockers and perhaps VPN and some other issues. But yeah, I don't want to promote any of

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the things that we are doing. So next question, like any websites, sources of information,

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of reference that we can refer to in order to find that the technologies you mentioned about

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surveillance? Well, I think if you are looking for something specific, I think you should email me

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and I can help you get back to you with a couple of links. Well, my source of information, one is

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that there are many great technology writers, investigative journalists, who really try to track

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this stuff down. And they publish in different like in the Verge, Vice and different other

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mainstream publications. And there are also independent bodies. So EDIRI are a good resource

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in Europe for this. Privacy International, it's mostly concerned with Europe. And there are the

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similar organizations in the US to document this kind of stuff. So I think I would go to that kind

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of sources. Any ideas on how Pegasus got into the smartphones? Was it like installing a special

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Android app? Yeah, I think I've listened to a discussion with a Hungarian journalist about this

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just recently. So the Pegasus malware is based on so called zero day exploits. So they work with

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hackers and like callers who try to find exploits in the operating systems, which are not have been

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have not been discovered before. So for example, they could manage to do a like an installation

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methodology, where they send just a link to someone on WhatsApp. So for example, for investigative

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journalists, here is an interesting leak about something that's happening in my country, and

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there is a link. And if you follow that link, you don't have to do anything. It just uses your

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this exploit in your phone and this vulnerability in your phone to restart the system and, and jail

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break it, which means that there is like a change in the whole operating system. And after that,

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they immediately take care of that phone. And there was like another thing that was discovered

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00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:12,560
that they didn't even have to click any links. I think it was through Skype or some sort of

391
00:42:12,560 --> 00:42:17,360
video call technology. If you had that app running in the background, they could send requests through

392
00:42:17,360 --> 00:42:21,920
that app, through that app, and no links, you wouldn't have to do anything. If you are sleeping

393
00:42:21,920 --> 00:42:25,840
and that happens on your phone, they were immediately installed. So this is this is the

394
00:42:25,840 --> 00:42:29,520
scariest thing about that, that you know, you might not have to do anything wrong for that.

395
00:42:29,520 --> 00:42:36,320
That you know, you might not have to do anything wrong for this. Yeah. And the last last question,

396
00:42:36,320 --> 00:42:42,080
how to fight crime while protecting the integrity of people? Yeah, this is this is the biggest

397
00:42:42,080 --> 00:42:46,560
biggest question, at least for me, this is the one I grapple with the most, like the ethical and more

398
00:42:46,560 --> 00:42:51,600
implications. I think this would could warrant the talk itself. Maybe it's a good idea for

399
00:42:51,600 --> 00:43:02,160
next talk, I'll think about it. I think there are ways to do all this kind of like crime fighting

400
00:43:02,160 --> 00:43:08,080
without going into surveillance or limiting it to very specific needs. So I think this is a scale.

401
00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:14,960
And on that scale, we are moving into the areas where a lot of like rights to freedom and freedom

402
00:43:14,960 --> 00:43:20,960
of association and stuff that I talked about, I really encroached on now. And and this is all

403
00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:26,560
done with the obfuscation. So I think we can tone it down a little bit and move back a couple of

404
00:43:26,560 --> 00:43:34,480
steps. And I think warranted, targeted surveillance on people that are, you know, proven to

405
00:43:36,080 --> 00:43:41,440
be a threat, and they have to be investigated, even like the child pornography and the terrorist

406
00:43:41,440 --> 00:43:48,560
stuff. So I think that should be done. I'm not arguing against any any type of any type of

407
00:43:48,560 --> 00:43:56,960
surveillance. But what is done with the with the increase in that scope, that creates a dragnet

408
00:43:56,960 --> 00:44:01,520
where everyone can become a suspect and you get you can become a suspect and it creates this kind

409
00:44:01,520 --> 00:44:06,880
of opening this kind of open door, where people use it for for others. So I think this crime

410
00:44:06,880 --> 00:44:11,840
fighting can be done maybe not as efficiently as right now, maybe a couple of percent less

411
00:44:11,840 --> 00:44:17,280
efficient. But the but this freedom protections and this right protections that that's not going

412
00:44:17,280 --> 00:44:22,720
to increase with the 10%, it's going to increase the manifold. So I think it's trade off. And I

413
00:44:22,720 --> 00:44:28,800
think it should be discussed because many people perhaps disagree with me. But there is a lot of

414
00:44:29,520 --> 00:44:34,400
methodologies available already to police the good old fashioned policing that can be done.

415
00:44:35,360 --> 00:44:41,280
And the stores that we are deploying now, so like the encryption for everyone, everyone should use

416
00:44:41,280 --> 00:44:47,520
signal I think for for communications just for these reasons that I've I've told you about. But

417
00:44:47,520 --> 00:44:52,160
I think that this is kind of like a utility that is available to everyone should be available to

418
00:44:52,160 --> 00:44:59,760
to everyone. So and utilities like like the roads and the water and everything else that's

419
00:44:59,760 --> 00:45:07,040
that's also available to criminals. And it's you cannot say that like people who are suspects or

420
00:45:07,040 --> 00:45:11,440
people who may might do some crime in the future, they cannot use our roads, you know, how do you

421
00:45:12,160 --> 00:45:17,600
how do you scan against that? So I think, you know, this is an interesting discussion. As I said,

422
00:45:17,600 --> 00:45:23,280
I'm just exploring these topics. These are all the tools that I had had for now. So but I'm really

423
00:45:23,280 --> 00:45:27,680
happy to continue conversation about this by email, because I'm really interested in this topic as

424
00:45:27,680 --> 00:45:37,200
well. So yeah, I think it's 45 now. Yeah, thanks for thanks for all your questions and your and

425
00:45:37,200 --> 00:45:45,680
your attention. So many thank you for many thank you for this session, Victor, we were very happy

426
00:45:45,680 --> 00:45:52,960
to have you here. Thank you. Thank you for the facilitation and have fun in the next couple of

427
00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:58,800
hours. Goodbye. Goodbye. Thank you.