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4452 lines
69 KiB
Text
4452 lines
69 KiB
Text
1
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Welcome to the first day of the Matomo camp,
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2
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00:00:10,000 --> 00:00:12,000
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or rather one of the first two days.
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00:00:12,000 --> 00:00:14,000
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But here we are in a German-speaking day.
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00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:18,000
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So the moderator here is Joachim Nickel,
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who has been using Matomo and Biwik for over 10 years
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00:00:22,000 --> 00:00:25,000
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and also engages in various open-source projects,
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such as, for example, especially the CMS Contao,
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8
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which you may have already heard of,
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and of which the funding association is the president.
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10
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And he will now tell you a little more about
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how to get a little more data experience in Matomo
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with background tracking
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and, in general, also with which alternatives
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there are for classic Matomo JavaScript tracking,
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which everyone knows.
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16
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With that, Joachim, you can start.
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Thank you, Lukas.
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Yes, hello.
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Let's start with the second slide with me.
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In the end, Lukas has already said a large part.
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I am an OMT ambassador.
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I will come to the OMT topic a little later.
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President of the Contao Association
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and Matomo for at least 2010,
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probably even a little longer.
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Today it's about the question, first of all,
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can I trust the numbers at all
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that we track in Matomo or anywhere else
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in this type of tracking?
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30
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And a little teaser at this point,
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31
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I would say a very clear no.
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32
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That has several reasons.
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Because if we take a look at how standard tracking works,
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what we have in Matomo,
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either via the Tag Manager
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or via normal JavaScript tracking,
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then the visitor comes to our website,
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gets the data, in the end,
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and in the website there is this little code
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that just says, you browser,
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give me the data back there to our Matomo
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and track the whole thing.
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And that's where we really have
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this huge problem with the data pass-on.
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45
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Because on the one hand there are these
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tracking protection stories,
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ETP and ETP, as they are not all so nice.
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On the other hand, we have the big problem
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of the user consent,
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which we have to use often
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in connection with the Do Not Track headers.
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But, and very specifically,
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the problem of the ad blocker.
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For 2021 I found a statistic
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that suggests that in Germany
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around 40% of users
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who are on the website
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use ad blockers.
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Over 42% worldwide.
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These values always differ
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differently from the manufacturers
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who give these statistics out.
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Some of them go up to 50%
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and it is very, very different
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with the individual websites,
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but we'll get to that in a moment.
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This fact was, in the end,
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the reason why I said
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that this path ahead
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is perhaps not necessarily the best,
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because too much data is lost.
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And that's why I say, okay,
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let's draw the path and go directly
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from the application to Matomo.
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Because Matomo has something very nice
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that other systems do not offer in this form,
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namely the Tracking API.
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The disadvantage with the whole thing
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is that the implementation
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has to take place in the application
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and we really have to collect
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all the parameters we need
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and we don't have the nice case
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like in JavaScript Tracking,
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that everything is already
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more or less out of the box
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and then we just have to collect
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these data and send it to Matomo.
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The tasks that arise with it
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are, on the one hand, clear.
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We have to clarify the topic of session handling,
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that is, how do we get the individual
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visitor sessions together?
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Matomo cannot take on this task
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for us at this point.
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We just have to take on this task
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and take care of the bot recognition
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for the most part, because everything
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that we throw directly against Matomo
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is ultimately evaluated there.
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Bot recognition at this point is
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difficult, because it is switched off.
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And we always have to take into account
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that we have a certain latency.
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That means that the application itself
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should send the request to Matomo
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only when the output is
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delivered to the web browser
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of the customer.
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But even then it's stupid
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if the process just takes too long,
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because the way to Matomo API
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is just too long.
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And so you could think about
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just getting the whole thing
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somewhere locally yourself
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and then first hand it over to Matomo.
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We have to work with a corresponding
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API key in the Matomo instance
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that has a writing access
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to, for example,
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hand over the IP address,
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either shortened or
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in plain text, to
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do the geo-IP resolution,
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or we do the geo-IP resolution
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directly in the application.
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And of course everyone agrees
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that the topic is data protection.
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That means we have a lot of data
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in the application.
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We can possibly identify the customer
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one-to-one directly
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and then have to think about
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which data will be handed over.
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It's up to Matomo not to get
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problems there in terms of
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data protection.
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Let's take a look at the comparison.
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On the one hand, I have a
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regional provider that I have
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equipped with standard tracking
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and in the background.
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And when I look at the whole thing,
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then I have a difference of
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about 60 percent,
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60 percent more data that I can
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identify in background tracking
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for these customers.
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We also see the deviation
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of the mobile types down here.
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That means whether it's a desktop system
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or a mobile system.
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154
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00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:36,000
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In background tracking, we have
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155
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00:05:36,000 --> 00:05:38,000
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much more desktop systems,
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156
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00:05:38,000 --> 00:05:40,000
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which raises the probability
|
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157
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00:05:40,000 --> 00:05:42,000
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or the assumption
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158
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|
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that the ad blocks are higher
|
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159
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00:05:44,000 --> 00:05:46,000
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on desktop browsers.
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160
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00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:48,000
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You have to say that was a time
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161
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00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:50,000
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when you couldn't change the standard
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162
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00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:52,000
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browser on iOS.
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163
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00:05:52,000 --> 00:05:54,000
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Now everything is a bit different.
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164
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00:05:54,000 --> 00:05:56,000
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Personally, I use both
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165
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00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:58,000
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on the desktop and on the phone
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166
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00:05:58,000 --> 00:06:00,000
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the browser Brave.
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167
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00:06:00,000 --> 00:06:02,000
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It makes the tracking
|
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168
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00:06:02,000 --> 00:06:04,000
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more difficult.
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169
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00:06:04,000 --> 00:06:06,000
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But at the same time, the information
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170
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00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:08,000
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with Matomo and in connection
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171
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00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:10,000
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with cookie-free tracking,
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172
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00:06:10,000 --> 00:06:12,000
|
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that the Matomo instance is on the same domain,
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173
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00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:14,000
|
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then the JavaScript tracking
|
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174
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00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:16,000
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comes through the Brave browser
|
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175
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00:06:16,000 --> 00:06:18,000
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while other things are kept
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176
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00:06:18,000 --> 00:06:20,000
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and decoupled.
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177
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00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:22,000
|
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Let's take a second look at
|
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178
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00:06:22,000 --> 00:06:24,000
|
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the KFZ online shop.
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179
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00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:26,000
|
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Here it looks like we have
|
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180
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00:06:26,000 --> 00:06:28,000
|
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about 30 percent more visits,
|
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181
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00:06:28,000 --> 00:06:30,000
|
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but already about 40 percent
|
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182
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00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:32,000
|
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more page views.
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183
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00:06:32,000 --> 00:06:34,000
|
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How does this come about?
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184
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00:06:34,000 --> 00:06:36,000
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From the situation,
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185
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00:06:36,000 --> 00:06:38,000
|
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in contrast to a regional provider,
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186
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00:06:38,000 --> 00:06:40,000
|
|
where I very often only have
|
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187
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00:06:40,000 --> 00:06:42,000
|
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one-pager visits,
|
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188
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00:06:42,000 --> 00:06:44,000
|
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I have much longer visits.
|
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189
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00:06:44,000 --> 00:06:46,000
|
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And if a user
|
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190
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00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:48,000
|
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who goes through the online shop
|
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191
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00:06:48,000 --> 00:06:50,000
|
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has a blocker,
|
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192
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00:06:50,000 --> 00:06:52,000
|
|
then the difference between
|
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193
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00:06:52,000 --> 00:06:54,000
|
|
the number of visits and the page views
|
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194
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00:06:54,000 --> 00:06:56,000
|
|
will be different.
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195
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00:06:56,000 --> 00:06:58,000
|
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I'll come back to that later.
|
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196
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00:06:58,000 --> 00:07:00,000
|
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Here I have the
|
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197
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00:07:00,000 --> 00:07:02,000
|
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short-term view of the telematics
|
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198
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|
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of the mobile browser.
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199
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00:07:04,000 --> 00:07:06,000
|
|
That means we had 74 percent
|
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|
200
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00:07:06,000 --> 00:07:08,000
|
|
mobile browser in standard tracking
|
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|
201
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00:07:08,000 --> 00:07:10,000
|
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and 67 percent in background tracking.
|
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202
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00:07:10,000 --> 00:07:12,000
|
|
That means the number of desktops
|
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203
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00:07:12,000 --> 00:07:14,000
|
|
has also increased again.
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204
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00:07:14,000 --> 00:07:16,000
|
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You always have to consider
|
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205
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00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:18,000
|
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this distinction, because
|
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206
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|
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there may be so much
|
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207
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00:07:20,000 --> 00:07:22,000
|
|
different data in background tracking
|
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208
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|
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that you have to consider
|
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209
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00:07:24,000 --> 00:07:26,000
|
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whether you actually wanted to choose
|
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210
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00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:28,000
|
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the right one.
|
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211
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00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:30,000
|
|
Now we come to the OMT.
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212
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00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:32,000
|
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The OMT is
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213
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00:07:32,000 --> 00:07:34,000
|
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an online platform
|
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214
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00:07:34,000 --> 00:07:36,000
|
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that is the meeting point for
|
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215
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00:07:36,000 --> 00:07:38,000
|
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further education and networks
|
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216
|
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00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:40,000
|
|
in online marketing.
|
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217
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00:07:40,000 --> 00:07:42,000
|
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The claim of the OMT is
|
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218
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00:07:42,000 --> 00:07:44,000
|
|
to learn from each other all your life.
|
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219
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00:07:44,000 --> 00:07:46,000
|
|
I am also the ambassador of the OMT
|
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220
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00:07:46,000 --> 00:07:48,000
|
|
and had the chance
|
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221
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00:07:48,000 --> 00:07:50,000
|
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to evaluate this page.
|
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222
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|
|
Here we had an installation
|
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223
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00:07:52,000 --> 00:07:54,000
|
|
of a Matomo standard.
|
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|
|
224
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00:07:54,000 --> 00:07:56,000
|
|
There were
|
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|
225
|
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00:07:56,000 --> 00:07:58,000
|
|
almost no deviations.
|
|
|
|
226
|
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00:07:58,000 --> 00:08:00,000
|
|
That's why I leave that
|
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227
|
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00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:02,000
|
|
out here with Google Analytics
|
|
|
|
228
|
|
00:08:02,000 --> 00:08:04,000
|
|
in comparison.
|
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|
229
|
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00:08:04,000 --> 00:08:06,000
|
|
Then we had an uplift of
|
|
|
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230
|
|
00:08:06,000 --> 00:08:08,000
|
|
15 percent in the visits.
|
|
|
|
231
|
|
00:08:08,000 --> 00:08:10,000
|
|
That was the big disappointment
|
|
|
|
232
|
|
00:08:10,000 --> 00:08:12,000
|
|
because the difference is
|
|
|
|
233
|
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00:08:12,000 --> 00:08:14,000
|
|
relatively small.
|
|
|
|
234
|
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00:08:14,000 --> 00:08:16,000
|
|
Apparently, not so many people
|
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|
|
235
|
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00:08:16,000 --> 00:08:18,000
|
|
use the system adblocker.
|
|
|
|
236
|
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00:08:18,000 --> 00:08:20,000
|
|
Then I looked at the data
|
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|
237
|
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00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:22,000
|
|
and realized that I had
|
|
|
|
238
|
|
00:08:22,000 --> 00:08:24,000
|
|
left out Google Analytics
|
|
|
|
239
|
|
00:08:24,000 --> 00:08:26,000
|
|
because that did not give us
|
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|
|
240
|
|
00:08:26,000 --> 00:08:28,000
|
|
any further points.
|
|
|
|
241
|
|
00:08:28,000 --> 00:08:30,000
|
|
We have 80 percent more
|
|
|
|
242
|
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00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:32,000
|
|
page views
|
|
|
|
243
|
|
00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:34,000
|
|
compared to the visits.
|
|
|
|
244
|
|
00:08:34,000 --> 00:08:36,000
|
|
That means 15 percent more visits
|
|
|
|
245
|
|
00:08:36,000 --> 00:08:38,000
|
|
but 80 percent more page views.
|
|
|
|
246
|
|
00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:40,000
|
|
I wanted to take a closer look
|
|
|
|
247
|
|
00:08:40,000 --> 00:08:42,000
|
|
at that.
|
|
|
|
248
|
|
00:08:42,000 --> 00:08:44,000
|
|
But first I looked at the statistics.
|
|
|
|
249
|
|
00:08:44,000 --> 00:08:46,000
|
|
This is an online learning platform.
|
|
|
|
250
|
|
00:08:46,000 --> 00:08:48,000
|
|
That means that people go
|
|
|
|
251
|
|
00:08:48,000 --> 00:08:50,000
|
|
there every week.
|
|
|
|
252
|
|
00:08:50,000 --> 00:08:52,000
|
|
That means that the weekend
|
|
|
|
253
|
|
00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:54,000
|
|
dates are much lower
|
|
|
|
254
|
|
00:08:54,000 --> 00:08:56,000
|
|
and that's why we have these
|
|
|
|
255
|
|
00:08:56,000 --> 00:08:58,000
|
|
interruptions.
|
|
|
|
256
|
|
00:08:58,000 --> 00:09:00,000
|
|
Here, too, we have a huge
|
|
|
|
257
|
|
00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:02,000
|
|
share of desktop users.
|
|
|
|
258
|
|
00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:04,000
|
|
That means that even in normal
|
|
|
|
259
|
|
00:09:04,000 --> 00:09:06,000
|
|
tracking we have 73 percent
|
|
|
|
260
|
|
00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:08,000
|
|
desktop users while in
|
|
|
|
261
|
|
00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:10,000
|
|
the background we even
|
|
|
|
262
|
|
00:09:10,000 --> 00:09:12,000
|
|
reach 84 percent.
|
|
|
|
263
|
|
00:09:12,000 --> 00:09:14,000
|
|
We already remember the
|
|
|
|
264
|
|
00:09:14,000 --> 00:09:16,000
|
|
73 to 84 percent because now
|
|
|
|
265
|
|
00:09:16,000 --> 00:09:18,000
|
|
we have a big difference.
|
|
|
|
266
|
|
00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:20,000
|
|
We have segmented the whole thing.
|
|
|
|
267
|
|
00:09:20,000 --> 00:09:22,000
|
|
I have left out all the
|
|
|
|
268
|
|
00:09:22,000 --> 00:09:24,000
|
|
individual page views to
|
|
|
|
269
|
|
00:09:24,000 --> 00:09:26,000
|
|
see what happens there.
|
|
|
|
270
|
|
00:09:26,000 --> 00:09:28,000
|
|
I have found out that
|
|
|
|
271
|
|
00:09:28,000 --> 00:09:30,000
|
|
with the visits we have
|
|
|
|
272
|
|
00:09:30,000 --> 00:09:32,000
|
|
no longer 15 percent but
|
|
|
|
273
|
|
00:09:32,000 --> 00:09:34,000
|
|
already 35 percent more.
|
|
|
|
274
|
|
00:09:34,000 --> 00:09:36,000
|
|
If we take a look at the
|
|
|
|
275
|
|
00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:38,000
|
|
page views at that point we
|
|
|
|
276
|
|
00:09:38,000 --> 00:09:40,000
|
|
even reach 140 percent.
|
|
|
|
277
|
|
00:09:40,000 --> 00:09:42,000
|
|
Before we had 15 percent
|
|
|
|
278
|
|
00:09:42,000 --> 00:09:44,000
|
|
to 35 percent
|
|
|
|
279
|
|
00:09:44,000 --> 00:09:46,000
|
|
and 80 percent
|
|
|
|
280
|
|
00:09:46,000 --> 00:09:48,000
|
|
to 180 percent.
|
|
|
|
281
|
|
00:09:48,000 --> 00:09:50,000
|
|
The share of users
|
|
|
|
282
|
|
00:09:50,000 --> 00:09:52,000
|
|
in the desktop area
|
|
|
|
283
|
|
00:09:52,000 --> 00:09:54,000
|
|
goes up to 91 percent
|
|
|
|
284
|
|
00:09:54,000 --> 00:09:56,000
|
|
by now.
|
|
|
|
285
|
|
00:09:56,000 --> 00:09:58,000
|
|
The database
|
|
|
|
286
|
|
00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:00,000
|
|
that we have here,
|
|
|
|
287
|
|
00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:02,000
|
|
with the page views at least
|
|
|
|
288
|
|
00:10:02,000 --> 00:10:04,000
|
|
two, looks like this.
|
|
|
|
289
|
|
00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:06,000
|
|
In standard tracking we have
|
|
|
|
290
|
|
00:10:06,000 --> 00:10:08,000
|
|
24 percent of visits that
|
|
|
|
291
|
|
00:10:08,000 --> 00:10:10,000
|
|
generate about 53 percent of page views.
|
|
|
|
292
|
|
00:10:10,000 --> 00:10:12,000
|
|
In background tracking
|
|
|
|
293
|
|
00:10:12,000 --> 00:10:14,000
|
|
we only have 5 percent
|
|
|
|
294
|
|
00:10:14,000 --> 00:10:16,000
|
|
more visits.
|
|
|
|
295
|
|
00:10:16,000 --> 00:10:18,000
|
|
But we have 18 percent more
|
|
|
|
296
|
|
00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:20,000
|
|
page views that are generated here.
|
|
|
|
297
|
|
00:10:20,000 --> 00:10:22,000
|
|
We clearly see the difference.
|
|
|
|
298
|
|
00:10:22,000 --> 00:10:24,000
|
|
The users, the app blockers
|
|
|
|
299
|
|
00:10:24,000 --> 00:10:26,000
|
|
in this case,
|
|
|
|
300
|
|
00:10:26,000 --> 00:10:28,000
|
|
bring a much higher number
|
|
|
|
301
|
|
00:10:28,000 --> 00:10:30,000
|
|
of page views.
|
|
|
|
302
|
|
00:10:30,000 --> 00:10:32,000
|
|
If we increase the whole thing to
|
|
|
|
303
|
|
00:10:32,000 --> 00:10:34,000
|
|
the number of page views of at least
|
|
|
|
304
|
|
00:10:34,000 --> 00:10:36,000
|
|
four, then this difference
|
|
|
|
305
|
|
00:10:36,000 --> 00:10:38,000
|
|
is much higher.
|
|
|
|
306
|
|
00:10:38,000 --> 00:10:40,000
|
|
Yes.
|
|
|
|
307
|
|
00:10:40,000 --> 00:10:42,000
|
|
Let's take a quick look at the
|
|
|
|
308
|
|
00:10:42,000 --> 00:10:44,000
|
|
technology from the front and from the back.
|
|
|
|
309
|
|
00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:46,000
|
|
From the front is
|
|
|
|
310
|
|
00:10:46,000 --> 00:10:48,000
|
|
clearly the normal standard
|
|
|
|
311
|
|
00:10:48,000 --> 00:10:50,000
|
|
tracking variant.
|
|
|
|
312
|
|
00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:52,000
|
|
The background tracking I have here in the middle
|
|
|
|
313
|
|
00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:54,000
|
|
and at the very bottom
|
|
|
|
314
|
|
00:10:54,000 --> 00:10:56,000
|
|
to compare the variant, if we
|
|
|
|
315
|
|
00:10:56,000 --> 00:10:58,000
|
|
run log file analytics with Matomo,
|
|
|
|
316
|
|
00:10:58,000 --> 00:11:00,000
|
|
so that you can see
|
|
|
|
317
|
|
00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:02,000
|
|
what the differences are.
|
|
|
|
318
|
|
00:11:02,000 --> 00:11:04,000
|
|
Events,
|
|
|
|
319
|
|
00:11:04,000 --> 00:11:06,000
|
|
i.e. event tracking, are not a
|
|
|
|
320
|
|
00:11:06,000 --> 00:11:08,000
|
|
topic at all.
|
|
|
|
321
|
|
00:11:08,000 --> 00:11:10,000
|
|
About the Tag Manager, about the normal JavaScript integration
|
|
|
|
322
|
|
00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:12,000
|
|
or the like,
|
|
|
|
323
|
|
00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:14,000
|
|
we can do everything perfectly.
|
|
|
|
324
|
|
00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:16,000
|
|
In background tracking, this is not possible
|
|
|
|
325
|
|
00:11:16,000 --> 00:11:18,000
|
|
from home at first.
|
|
|
|
326
|
|
00:11:18,000 --> 00:11:20,000
|
|
Because the tracking
|
|
|
|
327
|
|
00:11:20,000 --> 00:11:22,000
|
|
comes directly from the application,
|
|
|
|
328
|
|
00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:24,000
|
|
i.e. at the moment when the HTML
|
|
|
|
329
|
|
00:11:24,000 --> 00:11:26,000
|
|
is generated.
|
|
|
|
330
|
|
00:11:26,000 --> 00:11:28,000
|
|
So I don't know anything about the entire user interaction.
|
|
|
|
331
|
|
00:11:28,000 --> 00:11:30,000
|
|
If I
|
|
|
|
332
|
|
00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:32,000
|
|
wanted to bring that in,
|
|
|
|
333
|
|
00:11:32,000 --> 00:11:34,000
|
|
I would have to build my own interface
|
|
|
|
334
|
|
00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:36,000
|
|
with this data
|
|
|
|
335
|
|
00:11:36,000 --> 00:11:38,000
|
|
in addition to the tracking API
|
|
|
|
336
|
|
00:11:38,000 --> 00:11:40,000
|
|
within the application,
|
|
|
|
337
|
|
00:11:40,000 --> 00:11:42,000
|
|
using Matomo.
|
|
|
|
338
|
|
00:11:42,000 --> 00:11:44,000
|
|
This is a bit more complicated,
|
|
|
|
339
|
|
00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:46,000
|
|
but theoretically understandable.
|
|
|
|
340
|
|
00:11:46,000 --> 00:11:48,000
|
|
Within log file tracking, there is no chance
|
|
|
|
341
|
|
00:11:48,000 --> 00:11:50,000
|
|
to do anything with events at all.
|
|
|
|
342
|
|
00:11:50,000 --> 00:11:52,000
|
|
Internal elements tracking,
|
|
|
|
343
|
|
00:11:52,000 --> 00:11:54,000
|
|
exactly the same.
|
|
|
|
344
|
|
00:11:54,000 --> 00:11:56,000
|
|
Standard available in background tracking
|
|
|
|
345
|
|
00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:58,000
|
|
only via an own interface
|
|
|
|
346
|
|
00:11:58,000 --> 00:12:00,000
|
|
that we have to create.
|
|
|
|
347
|
|
00:12:00,000 --> 00:12:02,000
|
|
The same applies to the downloads,
|
|
|
|
348
|
|
00:12:02,000 --> 00:12:04,000
|
|
which are already available.
|
|
|
|
349
|
|
00:12:04,000 --> 00:12:06,000
|
|
That means we don't have any problems there.
|
|
|
|
350
|
|
00:12:06,000 --> 00:12:08,000
|
|
Also the outgoing links,
|
|
|
|
351
|
|
00:12:08,000 --> 00:12:10,000
|
|
the same variant over background tracking.
|
|
|
|
352
|
|
00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:12,000
|
|
I have to solve this on my own.
|
|
|
|
353
|
|
00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:14,000
|
|
These are all interactions within the browser
|
|
|
|
354
|
|
00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:16,000
|
|
that happen,
|
|
|
|
355
|
|
00:12:16,000 --> 00:12:18,000
|
|
which I can't get right away.
|
|
|
|
356
|
|
00:12:18,000 --> 00:12:20,000
|
|
In log file tracking, there is no chance
|
|
|
|
357
|
|
00:12:20,000 --> 00:12:22,000
|
|
to manage the whole thing at all.
|
|
|
|
358
|
|
00:12:22,000 --> 00:12:24,000
|
|
E-commerce tracking is not an issue at all
|
|
|
|
359
|
|
00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:26,000
|
|
in the background,
|
|
|
|
360
|
|
00:12:26,000 --> 00:12:28,000
|
|
because the data about e-commerce
|
|
|
|
361
|
|
00:12:28,000 --> 00:12:30,000
|
|
is even much earlier available
|
|
|
|
362
|
|
00:12:30,000 --> 00:12:32,000
|
|
than it would normally be.
|
|
|
|
363
|
|
00:12:32,000 --> 00:12:34,000
|
|
Also here in log file tracking,
|
|
|
|
364
|
|
00:12:34,000 --> 00:12:36,000
|
|
there is no chance to get there.
|
|
|
|
365
|
|
00:12:36,000 --> 00:12:38,000
|
|
Of course, we can use cookies
|
|
|
|
366
|
|
00:12:38,000 --> 00:12:40,000
|
|
to recognize the user again
|
|
|
|
367
|
|
00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:42,000
|
|
in standard tracking,
|
|
|
|
368
|
|
00:12:42,000 --> 00:12:44,000
|
|
in terms of how far you want to do it
|
|
|
|
369
|
|
00:12:44,000 --> 00:12:46,000
|
|
in terms of the user consent-free variant
|
|
|
|
370
|
|
00:12:46,000 --> 00:12:48,000
|
|
or whether you use hybrid tracking there.
|
|
|
|
371
|
|
00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:50,000
|
|
That is up to everyone.
|
|
|
|
372
|
|
00:12:50,000 --> 00:12:52,000
|
|
In the background, I have to think
|
|
|
|
373
|
|
00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:54,000
|
|
about something else
|
|
|
|
374
|
|
00:12:54,000 --> 00:12:56,000
|
|
how I can recognize the user again.
|
|
|
|
375
|
|
00:12:56,000 --> 00:12:58,000
|
|
Of course, I can also set a lifelong cookie
|
|
|
|
376
|
|
00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:00,000
|
|
with which I can identify the user
|
|
|
|
377
|
|
00:13:00,000 --> 00:13:02,000
|
|
afterwards,
|
|
|
|
378
|
|
00:13:02,000 --> 00:13:04,000
|
|
but I have to get the logic
|
|
|
|
379
|
|
00:13:04,000 --> 00:13:06,000
|
|
into the application.
|
|
|
|
380
|
|
00:13:06,000 --> 00:13:08,000
|
|
Adblockers are
|
|
|
|
381
|
|
00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:10,000
|
|
exactly the problem
|
|
|
|
382
|
|
00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:12,000
|
|
when it comes to standard tracking,
|
|
|
|
383
|
|
00:13:12,000 --> 00:13:14,000
|
|
which is why I want to do this background tracking.
|
|
|
|
384
|
|
00:13:14,000 --> 00:13:16,000
|
|
In background tracking,
|
|
|
|
385
|
|
00:13:16,000 --> 00:13:18,000
|
|
it is not an issue at all.
|
|
|
|
386
|
|
00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:20,000
|
|
All user data are coming in,
|
|
|
|
387
|
|
00:13:20,000 --> 00:13:22,000
|
|
even far too many,
|
|
|
|
388
|
|
00:13:22,000 --> 00:13:24,000
|
|
because all the normal bots
|
|
|
|
389
|
|
00:13:24,000 --> 00:13:26,000
|
|
are being protocolized here,
|
|
|
|
390
|
|
00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:28,000
|
|
but I'll get back to that in a moment.
|
|
|
|
391
|
|
00:13:28,000 --> 00:13:30,000
|
|
The same is true for lockfile tracking.
|
|
|
|
392
|
|
00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:32,000
|
|
I would like to briefly mention
|
|
|
|
393
|
|
00:13:32,000 --> 00:13:34,000
|
|
the topic of caching here.
|
|
|
|
394
|
|
00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:36,000
|
|
Standard caching,
|
|
|
|
395
|
|
00:13:36,000 --> 00:13:38,000
|
|
that is, HTTP caching,
|
|
|
|
396
|
|
00:13:38,000 --> 00:13:40,000
|
|
is not an issue with standard tracking at all.
|
|
|
|
397
|
|
00:13:40,000 --> 00:13:42,000
|
|
If I activate it
|
|
|
|
398
|
|
00:13:42,000 --> 00:13:44,000
|
|
or even use a CDN
|
|
|
|
399
|
|
00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:46,000
|
|
and want to use background tracking,
|
|
|
|
400
|
|
00:13:46,000 --> 00:13:48,000
|
|
I have problems there,
|
|
|
|
401
|
|
00:13:48,000 --> 00:13:50,000
|
|
because the data for the tracking
|
|
|
|
402
|
|
00:13:50,000 --> 00:13:52,000
|
|
no longer appears in the end application,
|
|
|
|
403
|
|
00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:54,000
|
|
because the data comes directly
|
|
|
|
404
|
|
00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:56,000
|
|
from the CDN,
|
|
|
|
405
|
|
00:13:56,000 --> 00:13:58,000
|
|
and so I have the problems
|
|
|
|
406
|
|
00:13:58,000 --> 00:14:00,000
|
|
to capture this data there.
|
|
|
|
407
|
|
00:14:00,000 --> 00:14:02,000
|
|
In the case of lockfile tracking,
|
|
|
|
408
|
|
00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:04,000
|
|
I would have to use
|
|
|
|
409
|
|
00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:06,000
|
|
the CDN tracking
|
|
|
|
410
|
|
00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:08,000
|
|
and not the individual server.
|
|
|
|
411
|
|
00:14:08,000 --> 00:14:10,000
|
|
Session recognition,
|
|
|
|
412
|
|
00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:12,000
|
|
of course, if I don't use cookies
|
|
|
|
413
|
|
00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:14,000
|
|
in standard tracking,
|
|
|
|
414
|
|
00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:16,000
|
|
it happens via fingerprinting.
|
|
|
|
415
|
|
00:14:16,000 --> 00:14:18,000
|
|
In background tracking,
|
|
|
|
416
|
|
00:14:18,000 --> 00:14:20,000
|
|
I have that via the system.
|
|
|
|
417
|
|
00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:22,000
|
|
Most of the time,
|
|
|
|
418
|
|
00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:24,000
|
|
I recognize the user
|
|
|
|
419
|
|
00:14:24,000 --> 00:14:26,000
|
|
during the session,
|
|
|
|
420
|
|
00:14:26,000 --> 00:14:28,000
|
|
and with that I have a much more accurate
|
|
|
|
421
|
|
00:14:28,000 --> 00:14:30,000
|
|
session recognition than I would have
|
|
|
|
422
|
|
00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:32,000
|
|
with fingerprinting or the like.
|
|
|
|
423
|
|
00:14:32,000 --> 00:14:34,000
|
|
When it comes to lockfile analytics,
|
|
|
|
424
|
|
00:14:34,000 --> 00:14:36,000
|
|
we don't have to think about it at all.
|
|
|
|
425
|
|
00:14:36,000 --> 00:14:38,000
|
|
Someone tried to find out from the IP address
|
|
|
|
426
|
|
00:14:38,000 --> 00:14:40,000
|
|
of the user agent
|
|
|
|
427
|
|
00:14:40,000 --> 00:14:42,000
|
|
whether it could be
|
|
|
|
428
|
|
00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:44,000
|
|
a coherent session or not.
|
|
|
|
429
|
|
00:14:44,000 --> 00:14:46,000
|
|
Lockfile tracking is always
|
|
|
|
430
|
|
00:14:46,000 --> 00:14:48,000
|
|
a nice parallel variant
|
|
|
|
431
|
|
00:14:48,000 --> 00:14:50,000
|
|
to get a feeling
|
|
|
|
432
|
|
00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:52,000
|
|
of what is going on
|
|
|
|
433
|
|
00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:54,000
|
|
in standard tracking
|
|
|
|
434
|
|
00:14:54,000 --> 00:14:56,000
|
|
in order to detect
|
|
|
|
435
|
|
00:14:56,000 --> 00:14:58,000
|
|
a size and target size.
|
|
|
|
436
|
|
00:14:58,000 --> 00:15:00,000
|
|
And that without the effort
|
|
|
|
437
|
|
00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:02,000
|
|
to integrate the whole thing
|
|
|
|
438
|
|
00:15:02,000 --> 00:15:04,000
|
|
within the system.
|
|
|
|
439
|
|
00:15:04,000 --> 00:15:06,000
|
|
Integration, of course,
|
|
|
|
440
|
|
00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:08,000
|
|
standard JavaScript code,
|
|
|
|
441
|
|
00:15:08,000 --> 00:15:10,000
|
|
simply bind in, and that's it.
|
|
|
|
442
|
|
00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:12,000
|
|
With background tracking,
|
|
|
|
443
|
|
00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:14,000
|
|
it has to take place in the application.
|
|
|
|
444
|
|
00:15:14,000 --> 00:15:16,000
|
|
I have developed a finished module
|
|
|
|
445
|
|
00:15:16,000 --> 00:15:18,000
|
|
for the CMS Contao.
|
|
|
|
446
|
|
00:15:18,000 --> 00:15:20,000
|
|
It's relatively wide.
|
|
|
|
447
|
|
00:15:20,000 --> 00:15:22,000
|
|
A few more tests have to be done.
|
|
|
|
448
|
|
00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:24,000
|
|
There are too many vulnerabilities
|
|
|
|
449
|
|
00:15:24,000 --> 00:15:26,000
|
|
with extensions that come in
|
|
|
|
450
|
|
00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:28,000
|
|
that could interfere with
|
|
|
|
451
|
|
00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:30,000
|
|
the extensions I have developed.
|
|
|
|
452
|
|
00:15:30,000 --> 00:15:32,000
|
|
We just have to do a few more tests.
|
|
|
|
453
|
|
00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:34,000
|
|
If you are interested in these extensions,
|
|
|
|
454
|
|
00:15:34,000 --> 00:15:36,000
|
|
feel free to contact me.
|
|
|
|
455
|
|
00:15:36,000 --> 00:15:38,000
|
|
Then we can take a look
|
|
|
|
456
|
|
00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:40,000
|
|
and do a little test.
|
|
|
|
457
|
|
00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:42,000
|
|
And with lockfile importing,
|
|
|
|
458
|
|
00:15:42,000 --> 00:15:44,000
|
|
of course, the whole thing has to be set up locally
|
|
|
|
459
|
|
00:15:44,000 --> 00:15:46,000
|
|
so that the lockfiles are imported.
|
|
|
|
460
|
|
00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:48,000
|
|
Let's get to the important point
|
|
|
|
461
|
|
00:15:48,000 --> 00:15:50,000
|
|
of recognizing bots.
|
|
|
|
462
|
|
00:15:50,000 --> 00:15:52,000
|
|
We basically have the situation
|
|
|
|
463
|
|
00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:54,000
|
|
within the web,
|
|
|
|
464
|
|
00:15:54,000 --> 00:15:56,000
|
|
just about 50 percent,
|
|
|
|
465
|
|
00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:58,000
|
|
maybe even 60 percent of the traffic
|
|
|
|
466
|
|
00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:00,000
|
|
that really follows by humans.
|
|
|
|
467
|
|
00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:02,000
|
|
A large part of 22,
|
|
|
|
468
|
|
00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:04,000
|
|
25 percent of such a thing
|
|
|
|
469
|
|
00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:06,000
|
|
in the shoot comes from harmless bots.
|
|
|
|
470
|
|
00:16:06,000 --> 00:16:08,000
|
|
Harmless bots are, for example,
|
|
|
|
471
|
|
00:16:08,000 --> 00:16:10,000
|
|
the Google bot itself, the Bing bot,
|
|
|
|
472
|
|
00:16:10,000 --> 00:16:12,000
|
|
Yandex and whatever they're called,
|
|
|
|
473
|
|
00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:14,000
|
|
but also all the other services
|
|
|
|
474
|
|
00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:16,000
|
|
like SysTrix, like Ksovi,
|
|
|
|
475
|
|
00:16:16,000 --> 00:16:18,000
|
|
or other services that know
|
|
|
|
476
|
|
00:16:18,000 --> 00:16:20,000
|
|
the websites, or even
|
|
|
|
477
|
|
00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:22,000
|
|
we ourselves, for example,
|
|
|
|
478
|
|
00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,000
|
|
Screaming Frog or something like that.
|
|
|
|
479
|
|
00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:26,000
|
|
All the bots that identify themselves
|
|
|
|
480
|
|
00:16:26,000 --> 00:16:28,000
|
|
based on the user agent string
|
|
|
|
481
|
|
00:16:28,000 --> 00:16:30,000
|
|
that they are bots,
|
|
|
|
482
|
|
00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:32,000
|
|
we can identify as harmless bots
|
|
|
|
483
|
|
00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:34,000
|
|
or evaluate in the form
|
|
|
|
484
|
|
00:16:34,000 --> 00:16:36,000
|
|
that we say, yes, we can
|
|
|
|
485
|
|
00:16:36,000 --> 00:16:38,000
|
|
filter them out anyway
|
|
|
|
486
|
|
00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:40,000
|
|
and we know what happens there
|
|
|
|
487
|
|
00:16:40,000 --> 00:16:42,000
|
|
and everything is fine.
|
|
|
|
488
|
|
00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:44,000
|
|
And the important thing
|
|
|
|
489
|
|
00:16:44,000 --> 00:16:46,000
|
|
that we should know,
|
|
|
|
490
|
|
00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:48,000
|
|
which is basically,
|
|
|
|
491
|
|
00:16:48,000 --> 00:16:50,000
|
|
whether it's Google Analytics,
|
|
|
|
492
|
|
00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:52,000
|
|
Matomo, Standard Tracking,
|
|
|
|
493
|
|
00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:54,000
|
|
or something like that,
|
|
|
|
494
|
|
00:16:54,000 --> 00:16:56,000
|
|
are these impersonator bots.
|
|
|
|
495
|
|
00:16:56,000 --> 00:16:58,000
|
|
That's about 25, 26 percent
|
|
|
|
496
|
|
00:16:58,000 --> 00:17:00,000
|
|
of the traffic goes to such bots.
|
|
|
|
497
|
|
00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:02,000
|
|
They act as if they were real people
|
|
|
|
498
|
|
00:17:02,000 --> 00:17:04,000
|
|
who search the websites.
|
|
|
|
499
|
|
00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:06,000
|
|
That means the user agent is
|
|
|
|
500
|
|
00:17:06,000 --> 00:17:08,000
|
|
falsely, logically,
|
|
|
|
501
|
|
00:17:08,000 --> 00:17:10,000
|
|
as if it were a normal Windows
|
|
|
|
502
|
|
00:17:10,000 --> 00:17:12,000
|
|
that accepts cookies, obsession cookies,
|
|
|
|
503
|
|
00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:14,000
|
|
long-term cookies.
|
|
|
|
504
|
|
00:17:14,000 --> 00:17:16,000
|
|
These cookies are sometimes
|
|
|
|
505
|
|
00:17:16,000 --> 00:17:18,000
|
|
divided over the instances.
|
|
|
|
506
|
|
00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:20,000
|
|
So I've seen things
|
|
|
|
507
|
|
00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:22,000
|
|
where I said, I really want to get to know
|
|
|
|
508
|
|
00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:24,000
|
|
these people who,
|
|
|
|
509
|
|
00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:26,000
|
|
within just 15 minutes,
|
|
|
|
510
|
|
00:17:26,000 --> 00:17:28,000
|
|
once from Asia, once from the USA
|
|
|
|
511
|
|
00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:30,000
|
|
and once from Sweden,
|
|
|
|
512
|
|
00:17:30,000 --> 00:17:32,000
|
|
access the website and every time
|
|
|
|
513
|
|
00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:34,000
|
|
only one and the same page,
|
|
|
|
514
|
|
00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:36,000
|
|
not the start page, but some sub-page.
|
|
|
|
515
|
|
00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,000
|
|
And we clearly recognize that
|
|
|
|
516
|
|
00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:40,000
|
|
these impersonator bots
|
|
|
|
517
|
|
00:17:40,000 --> 00:17:42,000
|
|
act as if they were real people.
|
|
|
|
518
|
|
00:17:42,000 --> 00:17:44,000
|
|
They also do scroll,
|
|
|
|
519
|
|
00:17:44,000 --> 00:17:46,000
|
|
they also do scroll events,
|
|
|
|
520
|
|
00:17:46,000 --> 00:17:48,000
|
|
they also solve reading time triggers
|
|
|
|
521
|
|
00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:50,000
|
|
and stuff like that.
|
|
|
|
522
|
|
00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:52,000
|
|
They actually click on buttons
|
|
|
|
523
|
|
00:17:52,000 --> 00:17:54,000
|
|
and solve CTAs.
|
|
|
|
524
|
|
00:17:54,000 --> 00:17:56,000
|
|
That means we recognize
|
|
|
|
525
|
|
00:17:56,000 --> 00:17:58,000
|
|
based on the behavior of these bots
|
|
|
|
526
|
|
00:17:58,000 --> 00:18:00,000
|
|
not whether they are real people
|
|
|
|
527
|
|
00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:02,000
|
|
or whether they are bots.
|
|
|
|
528
|
|
00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:04,000
|
|
They really do a damn good job
|
|
|
|
529
|
|
00:18:04,000 --> 00:18:06,000
|
|
and they annoy us in the statistics.
|
|
|
|
530
|
|
00:18:06,000 --> 00:18:08,000
|
|
I have an updated version
|
|
|
|
531
|
|
00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:10,000
|
|
from 2020
|
|
|
|
532
|
|
00:18:10,000 --> 00:18:12,000
|
|
from another provider.
|
|
|
|
533
|
|
00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:14,000
|
|
It assumes that we also
|
|
|
|
534
|
|
00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:16,000
|
|
have about 25% of web bots.
|
|
|
|
535
|
|
00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:18,000
|
|
Here you assume about 60% of humans.
|
|
|
|
536
|
|
00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:20,000
|
|
The values,
|
|
|
|
537
|
|
00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:22,000
|
|
you have to say again and again,
|
|
|
|
538
|
|
00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:24,000
|
|
such statistics are always colored.
|
|
|
|
539
|
|
00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:26,000
|
|
Depending on what kind of access
|
|
|
|
540
|
|
00:18:26,000 --> 00:18:28,000
|
|
the providers of the statistics have,
|
|
|
|
541
|
|
00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:30,000
|
|
they are different.
|
|
|
|
542
|
|
00:18:30,000 --> 00:18:32,000
|
|
That's why it always comes down to
|
|
|
|
543
|
|
00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:34,000
|
|
what is identifiable on your own website
|
|
|
|
544
|
|
00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,000
|
|
and can be tracked.
|
|
|
|
545
|
|
00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:38,000
|
|
Then you just have to do the things.
|
|
|
|
546
|
|
00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:40,000
|
|
I've brought you a little comparison
|
|
|
|
547
|
|
00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:42,000
|
|
with regards to impersonator bots.
|
|
|
|
548
|
|
00:18:42,000 --> 00:18:44,000
|
|
This comparison is a bit unfair.
|
|
|
|
549
|
|
00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:46,000
|
|
This is my own website
|
|
|
|
550
|
|
00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:48,000
|
|
that I had from August 31
|
|
|
|
551
|
|
00:18:48,000 --> 00:18:50,000
|
|
to September 19
|
|
|
|
552
|
|
00:18:50,000 --> 00:18:52,000
|
|
in parallel tracking
|
|
|
|
553
|
|
00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:54,000
|
|
with an automo instance
|
|
|
|
554
|
|
00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:56,000
|
|
where no bot recognition
|
|
|
|
555
|
|
00:18:56,000 --> 00:18:58,000
|
|
was in the grip
|
|
|
|
556
|
|
00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:00,000
|
|
and an instance
|
|
|
|
557
|
|
00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:02,000
|
|
in which I had everything
|
|
|
|
558
|
|
00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:04,000
|
|
that I could drive.
|
|
|
|
559
|
|
00:19:04,000 --> 00:19:06,000
|
|
A manually managed IP address
|
|
|
|
560
|
|
00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:08,000
|
|
list of bot networks
|
|
|
|
561
|
|
00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:10,000
|
|
and the like.
|
|
|
|
562
|
|
00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:12,000
|
|
The difference looks like this.
|
|
|
|
563
|
|
00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:14,000
|
|
The curve is identical,
|
|
|
|
564
|
|
00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:16,000
|
|
but not the number.
|
|
|
|
565
|
|
00:19:16,000 --> 00:19:18,000
|
|
I have almost half
|
|
|
|
566
|
|
00:19:18,000 --> 00:19:20,000
|
|
of real accesses
|
|
|
|
567
|
|
00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:22,000
|
|
that I could identify
|
|
|
|
568
|
|
00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:24,000
|
|
that they were really humans.
|
|
|
|
569
|
|
00:19:24,000 --> 00:19:26,000
|
|
The rest are actually
|
|
|
|
570
|
|
00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:28,000
|
|
such impersonator bots
|
|
|
|
571
|
|
00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:30,000
|
|
and they also produce
|
|
|
|
572
|
|
00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:32,000
|
|
completely different values
|
|
|
|
573
|
|
00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:34,000
|
|
for me in terms of pages.
|
|
|
|
574
|
|
00:19:34,000 --> 00:19:36,000
|
|
That means the data
|
|
|
|
575
|
|
00:19:36,000 --> 00:19:38,000
|
|
that I have here,
|
|
|
|
576
|
|
00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:40,000
|
|
reading time,
|
|
|
|
577
|
|
00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:42,000
|
|
jump rate and the like,
|
|
|
|
578
|
|
00:19:42,000 --> 00:19:44,000
|
|
are completely out of order
|
|
|
|
579
|
|
00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,000
|
|
because I have so many
|
|
|
|
580
|
|
00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:48,000
|
|
impersonator bots on it.
|
|
|
|
581
|
|
00:19:48,000 --> 00:19:50,000
|
|
Why do I have so many?
|
|
|
|
582
|
|
00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:52,000
|
|
That's almost twice
|
|
|
|
583
|
|
00:19:52,000 --> 00:19:54,000
|
|
what I have on normal visitors.
|
|
|
|
584
|
|
00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:56,000
|
|
This comparison is a bit mean
|
|
|
|
585
|
|
00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:58,000
|
|
because I use my website www.job.de
|
|
|
|
586
|
|
00:19:58,000 --> 00:20:00,000
|
|
at the same time
|
|
|
|
587
|
|
00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:02,000
|
|
as a forwarding target
|
|
|
|
588
|
|
00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:04,000
|
|
of over 100 other domains,
|
|
|
|
589
|
|
00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:06,000
|
|
partly expired domains,
|
|
|
|
590
|
|
00:20:06,000 --> 00:20:08,000
|
|
partly domains that I had
|
|
|
|
591
|
|
00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:10,000
|
|
before projects myself,
|
|
|
|
592
|
|
00:20:10,000 --> 00:20:12,000
|
|
but also certainly of the 30-40 domains
|
|
|
|
593
|
|
00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:14,000
|
|
that have never appeared anywhere
|
|
|
|
594
|
|
00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:16,000
|
|
that I have registered,
|
|
|
|
595
|
|
00:20:16,000 --> 00:20:18,000
|
|
but that have never appeared anywhere
|
|
|
|
596
|
|
00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:20,000
|
|
and still get these domains
|
|
|
|
597
|
|
00:20:20,000 --> 00:20:22,000
|
|
in large numbers from bots.
|
|
|
|
598
|
|
00:20:22,000 --> 00:20:24,000
|
|
That's why I use this website
|
|
|
|
599
|
|
00:20:24,000 --> 00:20:26,000
|
|
a bit like my little honeypot
|
|
|
|
600
|
|
00:20:26,000 --> 00:20:28,000
|
|
and can identify
|
|
|
|
601
|
|
00:20:28,000 --> 00:20:30,000
|
|
IP address segments
|
|
|
|
602
|
|
00:20:30,000 --> 00:20:32,000
|
|
that I then find out
|
|
|
|
603
|
|
00:20:32,000 --> 00:20:34,000
|
|
about whois analysis and the like,
|
|
|
|
604
|
|
00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:36,000
|
|
whether these data segments
|
|
|
|
605
|
|
00:20:36,000 --> 00:20:38,000
|
|
or these IP address segments
|
|
|
|
606
|
|
00:20:38,000 --> 00:20:40,000
|
|
serve network operators
|
|
|
|
607
|
|
00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:42,000
|
|
or not.
|
|
|
|
608
|
|
00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:44,000
|
|
Topic recognition of bots in general.
|
|
|
|
609
|
|
00:20:44,000 --> 00:20:46,000
|
|
User Agent is a voluntary
|
|
|
|
610
|
|
00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:48,000
|
|
application, that means it can
|
|
|
|
611
|
|
00:20:48,000 --> 00:20:50,000
|
|
definitely be faked. I shouldn't
|
|
|
|
612
|
|
00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:52,000
|
|
rely on that.
|
|
|
|
613
|
|
00:20:52,000 --> 00:20:54,000
|
|
It's difficult to use
|
|
|
|
614
|
|
00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:56,000
|
|
because only with the second
|
|
|
|
615
|
|
00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:58,000
|
|
access this variant can
|
|
|
|
616
|
|
00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:00,000
|
|
be tracked,
|
|
|
|
617
|
|
00:21:00,000 --> 00:21:02,000
|
|
but also bots accept
|
|
|
|
618
|
|
00:21:02,000 --> 00:21:04,000
|
|
these cookies and share
|
|
|
|
619
|
|
00:21:04,000 --> 00:21:06,000
|
|
the cookies, distribute these cookies
|
|
|
|
620
|
|
00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:08,000
|
|
over their entire network segment
|
|
|
|
621
|
|
00:21:08,000 --> 00:21:10,000
|
|
and finally only the IP address
|
|
|
|
622
|
|
00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:12,000
|
|
remains and we have to
|
|
|
|
623
|
|
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:14,000
|
|
build our own filter there.
|
|
|
|
624
|
|
00:21:14,000 --> 00:21:16,000
|
|
The problem at this point is
|
|
|
|
625
|
|
00:21:16,000 --> 00:21:18,000
|
|
we can't really identify
|
|
|
|
626
|
|
00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:20,000
|
|
die-in and static IP address segments
|
|
|
|
627
|
|
00:21:20,000 --> 00:21:22,000
|
|
and everything ends up
|
|
|
|
628
|
|
00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:24,000
|
|
in the background tracking.
|
|
|
|
629
|
|
00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:26,000
|
|
I have to go back
|
|
|
|
630
|
|
00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:28,000
|
|
and forth to search for
|
|
|
|
631
|
|
00:21:28,000 --> 00:21:30,000
|
|
manual pattern recognition
|
|
|
|
632
|
|
00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:32,000
|
|
in order to handle the whole thing.
|
|
|
|
633
|
|
00:21:32,000 --> 00:21:34,000
|
|
At this point I want to focus on
|
|
|
|
634
|
|
00:21:34,000 --> 00:21:36,000
|
|
an expansion of Matomo
|
|
|
|
635
|
|
00:21:36,000 --> 00:21:38,000
|
|
because when I look at the
|
|
|
|
636
|
|
00:21:38,000 --> 00:21:40,000
|
|
downloads of the tracking spam
|
|
|
|
637
|
|
00:21:40,000 --> 00:21:42,000
|
|
prevention, which was only
|
|
|
|
638
|
|
00:21:42,000 --> 00:21:44,000
|
|
at 1,828 when I
|
|
|
|
639
|
|
00:21:44,000 --> 00:21:46,000
|
|
made this screenshot,
|
|
|
|
640
|
|
00:21:46,000 --> 00:21:48,000
|
|
then that's extremely little.
|
|
|
|
641
|
|
00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:50,000
|
|
This expansion should
|
|
|
|
642
|
|
00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:52,000
|
|
be installed by everyone
|
|
|
|
643
|
|
00:21:52,000 --> 00:21:54,000
|
|
in their Matomo instance
|
|
|
|
644
|
|
00:21:54,000 --> 00:21:56,000
|
|
because I don't only have
|
|
|
|
645
|
|
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:58,000
|
|
the possibility to say I want
|
|
|
|
646
|
|
00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:00,000
|
|
to exclude IP address segments
|
|
|
|
647
|
|
00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:02,000
|
|
which are for example
|
|
|
|
648
|
|
00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:04,000
|
|
downloaded from well-known
|
|
|
|
649
|
|
00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:06,000
|
|
cloud providers like
|
|
|
|
650
|
|
00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:08,000
|
|
Oracle, Amazon,
|
|
|
|
651
|
|
00:22:08,000 --> 00:22:10,000
|
|
Azure Cloud and the like.
|
|
|
|
652
|
|
00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:12,000
|
|
Lists are automatically downloaded.
|
|
|
|
653
|
|
00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:14,000
|
|
They are not complete.
|
|
|
|
654
|
|
00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:16,000
|
|
I have to say that very clearly,
|
|
|
|
655
|
|
00:22:16,000 --> 00:22:18,000
|
|
but it's a very good approach.
|
|
|
|
656
|
|
00:22:18,000 --> 00:22:20,000
|
|
But here I have the
|
|
|
|
657
|
|
00:22:20,000 --> 00:22:22,000
|
|
possibility to do something
|
|
|
|
658
|
|
00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:24,000
|
|
about exclude countries
|
|
|
|
659
|
|
00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:26,000
|
|
to improve the data quality.
|
|
|
|
660
|
|
00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:28,000
|
|
For example, if I have a website
|
|
|
|
661
|
|
00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:30,000
|
|
where I am not at all interested
|
|
|
|
662
|
|
00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:32,000
|
|
in whether users from China,
|
|
|
|
663
|
|
00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:34,000
|
|
the USA, Sweden or the like
|
|
|
|
664
|
|
00:22:34,000 --> 00:22:36,000
|
|
should come,
|
|
|
|
665
|
|
00:22:36,000 --> 00:22:38,000
|
|
then we should see
|
|
|
|
666
|
|
00:22:38,000 --> 00:22:40,000
|
|
that this thing is
|
|
|
|
667
|
|
00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,000
|
|
possibly recorded
|
|
|
|
668
|
|
00:22:42,000 --> 00:22:44,000
|
|
in the exclude countries.
|
|
|
|
669
|
|
00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:46,000
|
|
Alternatively, to turn the whole thing
|
|
|
|
670
|
|
00:22:46,000 --> 00:22:48,000
|
|
around, if I say that I am really
|
|
|
|
671
|
|
00:22:48,000 --> 00:22:50,000
|
|
only interested in users from
|
|
|
|
672
|
|
00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:52,000
|
|
the German-speaking room, from the roof room,
|
|
|
|
673
|
|
00:22:52,000 --> 00:22:54,000
|
|
then I might just add
|
|
|
|
674
|
|
00:22:54,000 --> 00:22:56,000
|
|
Germany, Austria and Switzerland
|
|
|
|
675
|
|
00:22:56,000 --> 00:22:58,000
|
|
to it, possibly also France
|
|
|
|
676
|
|
00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:00,000
|
|
and England and similar things
|
|
|
|
677
|
|
00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:02,000
|
|
that come in a little bit.
|
|
|
|
678
|
|
00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:04,000
|
|
But these are the customers
|
|
|
|
679
|
|
00:23:04,000 --> 00:23:06,000
|
|
that interest me in my logging
|
|
|
|
680
|
|
00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:08,000
|
|
and I can eliminate
|
|
|
|
681
|
|
00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:10,000
|
|
an enormous number of log-in entries
|
|
|
|
682
|
|
00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:12,000
|
|
based on the fact that
|
|
|
|
683
|
|
00:23:12,000 --> 00:23:14,000
|
|
this geo-IP database is relatively
|
|
|
|
684
|
|
00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:16,000
|
|
up-to-date and works
|
|
|
|
685
|
|
00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:18,000
|
|
quite well.
|
|
|
|
686
|
|
00:23:18,000 --> 00:23:20,000
|
|
You have to say that this free
|
|
|
|
687
|
|
00:23:20,000 --> 00:23:22,000
|
|
database of a geo-IP that is
|
|
|
|
688
|
|
00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:24,000
|
|
installed or offered
|
|
|
|
689
|
|
00:23:24,000 --> 00:23:26,000
|
|
as standard at Matomo
|
|
|
|
690
|
|
00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:28,000
|
|
is not always 100%
|
|
|
|
691
|
|
00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:30,000
|
|
up-to-date due to the fact
|
|
|
|
692
|
|
00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:32,000
|
|
that it is a free variant.
|
|
|
|
693
|
|
00:23:32,000 --> 00:23:34,000
|
|
There is a cost-effective variant,
|
|
|
|
694
|
|
00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:36,000
|
|
which is much more up-to-date.
|
|
|
|
695
|
|
00:23:36,000 --> 00:23:38,000
|
|
There is also the MaxMind service,
|
|
|
|
696
|
|
00:23:38,000 --> 00:23:40,000
|
|
which is also much more up-to-date.
|
|
|
|
697
|
|
00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:42,000
|
|
In my opinion, this free variant
|
|
|
|
698
|
|
00:23:42,000 --> 00:23:44,000
|
|
is much more up-to-date.
|
|
|
|
699
|
|
00:23:44,000 --> 00:23:46,000
|
|
And the second variant is
|
|
|
|
700
|
|
00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:48,000
|
|
to take care of the list of
|
|
|
|
701
|
|
00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:50,000
|
|
globally ignored IP addresses
|
|
|
|
702
|
|
00:23:50,000 --> 00:23:52,000
|
|
by yourself.
|
|
|
|
703
|
|
00:23:52,000 --> 00:23:54,000
|
|
At this point, I have a list
|
|
|
|
704
|
|
00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:56,000
|
|
of over 1,400 IP address segments
|
|
|
|
705
|
|
00:23:56,000 --> 00:23:58,000
|
|
that I have identified
|
|
|
|
706
|
|
00:23:58,000 --> 00:24:00,000
|
|
and that I throw in here.
|
|
|
|
707
|
|
00:24:00,000 --> 00:24:02,000
|
|
But you have to say,
|
|
|
|
708
|
|
00:24:02,000 --> 00:24:04,000
|
|
if I have so much data in here,
|
|
|
|
709
|
|
00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:06,000
|
|
the load of Matomo is of course
|
|
|
|
710
|
|
00:24:06,000 --> 00:24:08,000
|
|
still quite a bit higher,
|
|
|
|
711
|
|
00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:10,000
|
|
because every single call
|
|
|
|
712
|
|
00:24:10,000 --> 00:24:12,000
|
|
is a bit higher.
|
|
|
|
713
|
|
00:24:12,000 --> 00:24:14,000
|
|
Finally, the manual pattern recognition
|
|
|
|
714
|
|
00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:16,000
|
|
is one of the most important things.
|
|
|
|
715
|
|
00:24:16,000 --> 00:24:18,000
|
|
We then have to check the IP address
|
|
|
|
716
|
|
00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:20,000
|
|
and carry out the cleaning of the log data.
|
|
|
|
717
|
|
00:24:20,000 --> 00:24:22,000
|
|
Matomo helps us
|
|
|
|
718
|
|
00:24:22,000 --> 00:24:24,000
|
|
by having this DSGVO
|
|
|
|
719
|
|
00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:26,000
|
|
or GDPR segment cleaning
|
|
|
|
720
|
|
00:24:26,000 --> 00:24:28,000
|
|
where I can say,
|
|
|
|
721
|
|
00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:30,000
|
|
OK, I would like to delete
|
|
|
|
722
|
|
00:24:30,000 --> 00:24:32,000
|
|
this IP address segment
|
|
|
|
723
|
|
00:24:32,000 --> 00:24:34,000
|
|
and then all this data
|
|
|
|
724
|
|
00:24:34,000 --> 00:24:36,000
|
|
will be taken out of Matomo
|
|
|
|
725
|
|
00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:38,000
|
|
and I can continue with it.
|
|
|
|
726
|
|
00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:40,000
|
|
I can also update it
|
|
|
|
727
|
|
00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:42,000
|
|
and then record this IP segment
|
|
|
|
728
|
|
00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:44,000
|
|
as an exclusion variant.
|
|
|
|
729
|
|
00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:46,000
|
|
In this context,
|
|
|
|
730
|
|
00:24:46,000 --> 00:24:48,000
|
|
I would like to briefly
|
|
|
|
731
|
|
00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:50,000
|
|
talk about the anonymization
|
|
|
|
732
|
|
00:24:50,000 --> 00:24:52,000
|
|
of IP addresses,
|
|
|
|
733
|
|
00:24:52,000 --> 00:24:54,000
|
|
because we have to briefly
|
|
|
|
734
|
|
00:24:54,000 --> 00:24:56,000
|
|
look at which settings
|
|
|
|
735
|
|
00:24:56,000 --> 00:24:58,000
|
|
I would like to make
|
|
|
|
736
|
|
00:24:58,000 --> 00:25:00,000
|
|
for this case,
|
|
|
|
737
|
|
00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:02,000
|
|
that I would like to make
|
|
|
|
738
|
|
00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:04,000
|
|
a manual pattern recognition
|
|
|
|
739
|
|
00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:06,000
|
|
and clean the data
|
|
|
|
740
|
|
00:25:06,000 --> 00:25:08,000
|
|
of the 254 IP addresses
|
|
|
|
741
|
|
00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:10,000
|
|
together.
|
|
|
|
742
|
|
00:25:10,000 --> 00:25:12,000
|
|
And I can say relatively precisely,
|
|
|
|
743
|
|
00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:14,000
|
|
OK, this IP address segment
|
|
|
|
744
|
|
00:25:14,000 --> 00:25:16,000
|
|
is most likely
|
|
|
|
745
|
|
00:25:16,000 --> 00:25:18,000
|
|
only in the input area
|
|
|
|
746
|
|
00:25:18,000 --> 00:25:20,000
|
|
of a service provider.
|
|
|
|
747
|
|
00:25:20,000 --> 00:25:22,000
|
|
Especially with cloud providers,
|
|
|
|
748
|
|
00:25:22,000 --> 00:25:24,000
|
|
they usually have at least
|
|
|
|
749
|
|
00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:26,000
|
|
this class 10,
|
|
|
|
750
|
|
00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,000
|
|
i.e. 254 IP addresses,
|
|
|
|
751
|
|
00:25:28,000 --> 00:25:30,000
|
|
which I can identify
|
|
|
|
752
|
|
00:25:30,000 --> 00:25:32,000
|
|
relatively well about,
|
|
|
|
753
|
|
00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:34,000
|
|
even if I use the variant
|
|
|
|
754
|
|
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:36,000
|
|
in addition to that,
|
|
|
|
755
|
|
00:25:36,000 --> 00:25:38,000
|
|
I can just look at how this entire IP address segment
|
|
|
|
756
|
|
00:25:38,000 --> 00:25:40,000
|
|
belongs and then I can get a little bit
|
|
|
|
757
|
|
00:25:40,000 --> 00:25:42,000
|
|
more information about it.
|
|
|
|
758
|
|
00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,000
|
|
If I leave the standard variant,
|
|
|
|
759
|
|
00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:46,000
|
|
which is recommended for Matomo,
|
|
|
|
760
|
|
00:25:46,000 --> 00:25:48,000
|
|
i.e. this two-byte variant,
|
|
|
|
761
|
|
00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:50,000
|
|
then I pack 65,000 IP addresses
|
|
|
|
762
|
|
00:25:50,000 --> 00:25:52,000
|
|
into this cluster.
|
|
|
|
763
|
|
00:25:52,000 --> 00:25:54,000
|
|
That's definitely too much.
|
|
|
|
764
|
|
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:56,000
|
|
So if I use this setting in Matomo,
|
|
|
|
765
|
|
00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:58,000
|
|
I can bend it,
|
|
|
|
766
|
|
00:25:58,000 --> 00:26:00,000
|
|
somehow trying to identify
|
|
|
|
767
|
|
00:26:00,000 --> 00:26:02,000
|
|
whether this data
|
|
|
|
768
|
|
00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:04,000
|
|
or whether this access
|
|
|
|
769
|
|
00:26:04,000 --> 00:26:06,000
|
|
came from an IP address segment
|
|
|
|
770
|
|
00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:08,000
|
|
which is a network provider service
|
|
|
|
771
|
|
00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:10,000
|
|
or something like that, or whether it is
|
|
|
|
772
|
|
00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,000
|
|
a dial-in network, then I can completely
|
|
|
|
773
|
|
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:14,000
|
|
forget about it. And if we go to 3-byte,
|
|
|
|
774
|
|
00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:16,000
|
|
then we don't even need to talk about it,
|
|
|
|
775
|
|
00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:18,000
|
|
that's rather 16 million IP addresses.
|
|
|
|
776
|
|
00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:20,000
|
|
Then I can actually
|
|
|
|
777
|
|
00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:22,000
|
|
completely ignore this lockfall analytics
|
|
|
|
778
|
|
00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:24,000
|
|
related to the visitor variants.
|
|
|
|
779
|
|
00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:28,000
|
|
The data protection history down here,
|
|
|
|
780
|
|
00:26:28,000 --> 00:26:30,000
|
|
in this case for our
|
|
|
|
781
|
|
00:26:30,000 --> 00:26:32,000
|
|
certification for bots and the like,
|
|
|
|
782
|
|
00:26:32,000 --> 00:26:34,000
|
|
is rather not very interesting.
|
|
|
|
783
|
|
00:26:34,000 --> 00:26:36,000
|
|
And what is it all about in the end?
|
|
|
|
784
|
|
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:38,000
|
|
In the end, you just have to go through
|
|
|
|
785
|
|
00:26:38,000 --> 00:26:40,000
|
|
the visitor log in this manual recognition
|
|
|
|
786
|
|
00:26:40,000 --> 00:26:42,000
|
|
and then just look at
|
|
|
|
787
|
|
00:26:42,000 --> 00:26:44,000
|
|
these IP address segments
|
|
|
|
788
|
|
00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:46,000
|
|
and take a look at
|
|
|
|
789
|
|
00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:48,000
|
|
the whole thing
|
|
|
|
790
|
|
00:26:48,000 --> 00:26:50,000
|
|
according to the UIS database.
|
|
|
|
791
|
|
00:26:50,000 --> 00:26:52,000
|
|
Yes, that actually
|
|
|
|
792
|
|
00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:54,000
|
|
brings me to the summary
|
|
|
|
793
|
|
00:26:54,000 --> 00:26:56,000
|
|
of my lecture.
|
|
|
|
794
|
|
00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:58,000
|
|
If we really want to have
|
|
|
|
795
|
|
00:26:58,000 --> 00:27:00,000
|
|
complete visitor data,
|
|
|
|
796
|
|
00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:02,000
|
|
we have to rely on the background tracking.
|
|
|
|
797
|
|
00:27:02,000 --> 00:27:04,000
|
|
Alternatively, with a
|
|
|
|
798
|
|
00:27:04,000 --> 00:27:06,000
|
|
lower entry threshold,
|
|
|
|
799
|
|
00:27:06,000 --> 00:27:08,000
|
|
to first look at what is going on
|
|
|
|
800
|
|
00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:10,000
|
|
with ad blockers, possibly lost,
|
|
|
|
801
|
|
00:27:10,000 --> 00:27:12,000
|
|
is the lockfall analytics.
|
|
|
|
802
|
|
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:14,000
|
|
The problem at this point,
|
|
|
|
803
|
|
00:27:14,000 --> 00:27:16,000
|
|
if I have too much anonymized
|
|
|
|
804
|
|
00:27:16,000 --> 00:27:18,000
|
|
the lockfiles from the IP address,
|
|
|
|
805
|
|
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:20,000
|
|
that is, even more than this class C segment,
|
|
|
|
806
|
|
00:27:20,000 --> 00:27:22,000
|
|
then I can not leave Matomo
|
|
|
|
807
|
|
00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:24,000
|
|
the chance to filter out
|
|
|
|
808
|
|
00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:26,000
|
|
certain data
|
|
|
|
809
|
|
00:27:26,000 --> 00:27:28,000
|
|
in this tracking spam prevention
|
|
|
|
810
|
|
00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:30,000
|
|
variant or
|
|
|
|
811
|
|
00:27:30,000 --> 00:27:32,000
|
|
the own IP address filter
|
|
|
|
812
|
|
00:27:32,000 --> 00:27:34,000
|
|
history.
|
|
|
|
813
|
|
00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:36,000
|
|
If a class C net or a class B net
|
|
|
|
814
|
|
00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:38,000
|
|
is only anonymized,
|
|
|
|
815
|
|
00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:40,000
|
|
then I can forget about the lockfiles
|
|
|
|
816
|
|
00:27:40,000 --> 00:27:42,000
|
|
to really clean up the data.
|
|
|
|
817
|
|
00:27:42,000 --> 00:27:44,000
|
|
I will get insights
|
|
|
|
818
|
|
00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:46,000
|
|
without question,
|
|
|
|
819
|
|
00:27:46,000 --> 00:27:48,000
|
|
but I will not be able to
|
|
|
|
820
|
|
00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:50,000
|
|
identify whether these were
|
|
|
|
821
|
|
00:27:50,000 --> 00:27:52,000
|
|
normal user accesses
|
|
|
|
822
|
|
00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:54,000
|
|
or rather accesses
|
|
|
|
823
|
|
00:27:54,000 --> 00:27:56,000
|
|
from on-board networks.
|
|
|
|
824
|
|
00:27:56,000 --> 00:27:58,000
|
|
By doing this,
|
|
|
|
825
|
|
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,000
|
|
I can deal with the background tracking
|
|
|
|
826
|
|
00:28:00,000 --> 00:28:02,000
|
|
or lockfile stories with the ad blocker
|
|
|
|
827
|
|
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:04,000
|
|
and have to see how it is
|
|
|
|
828
|
|
00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:06,000
|
|
with the application levels,
|
|
|
|
829
|
|
00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:08,000
|
|
i.e. with the HTTP and user caching.
|
|
|
|
830
|
|
00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:10,000
|
|
Application caching in general,
|
|
|
|
831
|
|
00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:12,000
|
|
i.e. where can I use it?
|
|
|
|
832
|
|
00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:14,000
|
|
Does it even help me to develop
|
|
|
|
833
|
|
00:28:14,000 --> 00:28:16,000
|
|
this background tracking?
|
|
|
|
834
|
|
00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:18,000
|
|
I just have to have a good strategy
|
|
|
|
835
|
|
00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:20,000
|
|
in terms of onboard recognition,
|
|
|
|
836
|
|
00:28:20,000 --> 00:28:22,000
|
|
which, as I said,
|
|
|
|
837
|
|
00:28:22,000 --> 00:28:24,000
|
|
has an IP address filter,
|
|
|
|
838
|
|
00:28:24,000 --> 00:28:26,000
|
|
and my recommendation at this point
|
|
|
|
839
|
|
00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:28,000
|
|
is always to carry out
|
|
|
|
840
|
|
00:28:28,000 --> 00:28:30,000
|
|
parallel tracking from the front,
|
|
|
|
841
|
|
00:28:30,000 --> 00:28:32,000
|
|
i.e. normal tracking by JavaScript,
|
|
|
|
842
|
|
00:28:32,000 --> 00:28:34,000
|
|
and the tracking from the back
|
|
|
|
843
|
|
00:28:34,000 --> 00:28:36,000
|
|
in parallel, because from the front
|
|
|
|
844
|
|
00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:38,000
|
|
I get insights that I only get
|
|
|
|
845
|
|
00:28:38,000 --> 00:28:40,000
|
|
with considerable effort through
|
|
|
|
846
|
|
00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:42,000
|
|
the background tracking.
|
|
|
|
847
|
|
00:28:42,000 --> 00:28:44,000
|
|
Here in the background tracking,
|
|
|
|
848
|
|
00:28:44,000 --> 00:28:46,000
|
|
I really want to find out
|
|
|
|
849
|
|
00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,000
|
|
what kind of loss
|
|
|
|
850
|
|
00:28:48,000 --> 00:28:50,000
|
|
we have in normal tracking
|
|
|
|
851
|
|
00:28:50,000 --> 00:28:52,000
|
|
i.e. the normal tracking
|
|
|
|
852
|
|
00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:54,000
|
|
with the corresponding factor x
|
|
|
|
853
|
|
00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:56,000
|
|
to calculate us a little nicely
|
|
|
|
854
|
|
00:28:56,000 --> 00:28:58,000
|
|
and to get better insights
|
|
|
|
855
|
|
00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:00,000
|
|
at this point.
|
|
|
|
856
|
|
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:02,000
|
|
We have to say that
|
|
|
|
857
|
|
00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:04,000
|
|
when I looked at the OMT thing,
|
|
|
|
858
|
|
00:29:04,000 --> 00:29:06,000
|
|
there is no way to say
|
|
|
|
859
|
|
00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:08,000
|
|
I'll just take the factor 1.5
|
|
|
|
860
|
|
00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:10,000
|
|
to calculate
|
|
|
|
861
|
|
00:29:10,000 --> 00:29:12,000
|
|
what I would have
|
|
|
|
862
|
|
00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:14,000
|
|
on users.
|
|
|
|
863
|
|
00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:16,000
|
|
I really lose a lot of
|
|
|
|
864
|
|
00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:18,000
|
|
facts that, especially in the
|
|
|
|
865
|
|
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:20,000
|
|
convergence or performance marketing,
|
|
|
|
866
|
|
00:29:20,000 --> 00:29:22,000
|
|
are relevant.
|
|
|
|
867
|
|
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,000
|
|
Because if I really lose
|
|
|
|
868
|
|
00:29:24,000 --> 00:29:26,000
|
|
the user who generates
|
|
|
|
869
|
|
00:29:26,000 --> 00:29:28,000
|
|
much more page views,
|
|
|
|
870
|
|
00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:30,000
|
|
who generates revenue,
|
|
|
|
871
|
|
00:29:30,000 --> 00:29:32,000
|
|
who makes the purchases,
|
|
|
|
872
|
|
00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:34,000
|
|
if I don't have it in standard tracking,
|
|
|
|
873
|
|
00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:36,000
|
|
but I can capture it in background tracking,
|
|
|
|
874
|
|
00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:38,000
|
|
then that's a completely different topic
|
|
|
|
875
|
|
00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:40,000
|
|
on which I could then
|
|
|
|
876
|
|
00:29:40,000 --> 00:29:42,000
|
|
control my Google Ads
|
|
|
|
877
|
|
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:44,000
|
|
investments differently.
|
|
|
|
878
|
|
00:29:44,000 --> 00:29:46,000
|
|
Because I really see
|
|
|
|
879
|
|
00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:48,000
|
|
that the display A performs
|
|
|
|
880
|
|
00:29:48,000 --> 00:29:50,000
|
|
much better than the display B,
|
|
|
|
881
|
|
00:29:50,000 --> 00:29:52,000
|
|
how I could normally take it out of standard tracking.
|
|
|
|
882
|
|
00:29:52,000 --> 00:29:54,000
|
|
So from there
|
|
|
|
883
|
|
00:29:54,000 --> 00:29:56,000
|
|
look, what does it look like?
|
|
|
|
884
|
|
00:29:56,000 --> 00:29:58,000
|
|
Then just clearly the topic
|
|
|
|
885
|
|
00:29:58,000 --> 00:30:00,000
|
|
of privacy by design,
|
|
|
|
886
|
|
00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,000
|
|
what about user consent
|
|
|
|
887
|
|
00:30:02,000 --> 00:30:04,000
|
|
that we really completely
|
|
|
|
888
|
|
00:30:04,000 --> 00:30:06,000
|
|
anonymize the data
|
|
|
|
889
|
|
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:08,000
|
|
and of course run our Matomo instance
|
|
|
|
890
|
|
00:30:08,000 --> 00:30:10,000
|
|
on our own server.
|
|
|
|
891
|
|
00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:12,000
|
|
And then the whole thing could,
|
|
|
|
892
|
|
00:30:12,000 --> 00:30:14,000
|
|
depending on how we deal with our data protection
|
|
|
|
893
|
|
00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:16,000
|
|
then also work well.
|
|
|
|
894
|
|
00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:18,000
|
|
Yes, I would say
|
|
|
|
895
|
|
00:30:18,000 --> 00:30:20,000
|
|
half an hour talk, half an hour
|
|
|
|
896
|
|
00:30:20,000 --> 00:30:22,000
|
|
point landing and from there I say
|
|
|
|
897
|
|
00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:24,000
|
|
thank you very much
|
|
|
|
898
|
|
00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:26,000
|
|
and yes, I am now looking forward
|
|
|
|
899
|
|
00:30:26,000 --> 00:30:28,000
|
|
to questions that may come in.
|
|
|
|
900
|
|
00:30:28,000 --> 00:30:30,000
|
|
Exactly, now would be the time
|
|
|
|
901
|
|
00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:32,000
|
|
for any questions,
|
|
|
|
902
|
|
00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:34,000
|
|
comments, other things
|
|
|
|
903
|
|
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,000
|
|
about the topic.
|
|
|
|
904
|
|
00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:38,000
|
|
There has already been a question discussion,
|
|
|
|
905
|
|
00:30:38,000 --> 00:30:40,000
|
|
which I would have asked, otherwise
|
|
|
|
906
|
|
00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:42,000
|
|
you could maybe start right away,
|
|
|
|
907
|
|
00:30:42,000 --> 00:30:44,000
|
|
a little bit about data protection,
|
|
|
|
908
|
|
00:30:44,000 --> 00:30:46,000
|
|
opt-out and so on.
|
|
|
|
909
|
|
00:30:46,000 --> 00:30:48,000
|
|
The problem is with the normal
|
|
|
|
910
|
|
00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:50,000
|
|
JavaScript tracking it is relatively
|
|
|
|
911
|
|
00:30:50,000 --> 00:30:52,000
|
|
simple to make an opt-out,
|
|
|
|
912
|
|
00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:54,000
|
|
because you put a cookie,
|
|
|
|
913
|
|
00:30:54,000 --> 00:30:56,000
|
|
it just works with the Matomo function
|
|
|
|
914
|
|
00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:58,000
|
|
and with that it is relatively
|
|
|
|
915
|
|
00:30:58,000 --> 00:31:00,000
|
|
straightforward. With a
|
|
|
|
916
|
|
00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:02,000
|
|
background tracking you have to more or less
|
|
|
|
917
|
|
00:31:02,000 --> 00:31:04,000
|
|
implement it yourself.
|
|
|
|
918
|
|
00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:06,000
|
|
In the background tracking everything
|
|
|
|
919
|
|
00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:08,000
|
|
has to be integrated by itself,
|
|
|
|
920
|
|
00:31:08,000 --> 00:31:10,000
|
|
but right there I can of course also
|
|
|
|
921
|
|
00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:12,000
|
|
take back a JavaScript-based cookie
|
|
|
|
922
|
|
00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:14,000
|
|
and interpret whether
|
|
|
|
923
|
|
00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:16,000
|
|
I can use it,
|
|
|
|
924
|
|
00:31:16,000 --> 00:31:18,000
|
|
want to use it. At this point
|
|
|
|
925
|
|
00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:20,000
|
|
you have to say, of course, that
|
|
|
|
926
|
|
00:31:20,000 --> 00:31:22,000
|
|
background tracking is a purely
|
|
|
|
927
|
|
00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:24,000
|
|
technical approach,
|
|
|
|
928
|
|
00:31:24,000 --> 00:31:26,000
|
|
which in principle first of all
|
|
|
|
929
|
|
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:28,000
|
|
makes the data available.
|
|
|
|
930
|
|
00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:30,000
|
|
How we handle the whole data protection
|
|
|
|
931
|
|
00:31:30,000 --> 00:31:32,000
|
|
is still a second question.
|
|
|
|
932
|
|
00:31:32,000 --> 00:31:34,000
|
|
I just wanted the basic idea
|
|
|
|
933
|
|
00:31:34,000 --> 00:31:36,000
|
|
that the background tracking
|
|
|
|
934
|
|
00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:38,000
|
|
and the possibility of data
|
|
|
|
935
|
|
00:31:38,000 --> 00:31:40,000
|
|
coming in and presenting,
|
|
|
|
936
|
|
00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:42,000
|
|
but yes, if we really talk about an opt-out
|
|
|
|
937
|
|
00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:44,000
|
|
and really need this
|
|
|
|
938
|
|
00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:46,000
|
|
data or
|
|
|
|
939
|
|
00:31:46,000 --> 00:31:48,000
|
|
have to implement it in the necessary way,
|
|
|
|
940
|
|
00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:50,000
|
|
then it's right, then you can do it
|
|
|
|
941
|
|
00:31:50,000 --> 00:31:52,000
|
|
with a cookie and I can use it
|
|
|
|
942
|
|
00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:54,000
|
|
in the application.
|
|
|
|
943
|
|
00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:02,000
|
|
If there are no further questions,
|
|
|
|
944
|
|
00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:04,000
|
|
let's leave
|
|
|
|
945
|
|
00:32:04,000 --> 00:32:06,000
|
|
the people a little bit of time,
|
|
|
|
946
|
|
00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:08,000
|
|
there is a bit of delay between
|
|
|
|
947
|
|
00:32:08,000 --> 00:32:10,000
|
|
what we are talking about here until
|
|
|
|
948
|
|
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:12,000
|
|
the people see it.
|
|
|
|
949
|
|
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:16,000
|
|
Either I have explained everything
|
|
|
|
950
|
|
00:32:16,000 --> 00:32:18,000
|
|
so beautifully or no one
|
|
|
|
951
|
|
00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:20,000
|
|
dares to. Oh, someone is typing.
|
|
|
|
952
|
|
00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:22,000
|
|
Yes, perfect.
|
|
|
|
953
|
|
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:28,000
|
|
Otherwise, you are welcome to contact me
|
|
|
|
954
|
|
00:32:28,000 --> 00:32:30,000
|
|
at LinkedIn and Facebook
|
|
|
|
955
|
|
00:32:30,000 --> 00:32:32,000
|
|
and feel free to ask questions
|
|
|
|
956
|
|
00:32:32,000 --> 00:32:34,000
|
|
at any time. I am happy to
|
|
|
|
957
|
|
00:32:34,000 --> 00:32:36,000
|
|
be at your disposal.
|
|
|
|
958
|
|
00:32:36,000 --> 00:32:38,000
|
|
Exactly, and if you come up with anything
|
|
|
|
959
|
|
00:32:38,000 --> 00:32:40,000
|
|
in the next few hours, the chat room
|
|
|
|
960
|
|
00:32:40,000 --> 00:32:42,000
|
|
will remain open, it is only for one talk,
|
|
|
|
961
|
|
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:44,000
|
|
you can just continue
|
|
|
|
962
|
|
00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:46,000
|
|
during the whole MatomoCamps.
|
|
|
|
963
|
|
00:32:48,000 --> 00:32:50,000
|
|
A question from the chat room.
|
|
|
|
964
|
|
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:52,000
|
|
Do you have any experience
|
|
|
|
965
|
|
00:32:52,000 --> 00:32:54,000
|
|
with hybrid applications?
|
|
|
|
966
|
|
00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:56,000
|
|
Yes, I have two
|
|
|
|
967
|
|
00:32:56,000 --> 00:32:58,000
|
|
applications currently
|
|
|
|
968
|
|
00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:00,000
|
|
in the pre-planning, where we
|
|
|
|
969
|
|
00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:02,000
|
|
want to implement the normal tracking
|
|
|
|
970
|
|
00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:04,000
|
|
of the user consent
|
|
|
|
971
|
|
00:33:04,000 --> 00:33:06,000
|
|
and then also
|
|
|
|
972
|
|
00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:08,000
|
|
set the appropriate user cookie
|
|
|
|
973
|
|
00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:10,000
|
|
if the user consent is available,
|
|
|
|
974
|
|
00:33:10,000 --> 00:33:12,000
|
|
is in the planning, but I don't have any
|
|
|
|
975
|
|
00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:14,000
|
|
experience with it yet.
|
|
|
|
976
|
|
00:33:14,000 --> 00:33:16,000
|
|
Tracking for the MP3 calls,
|
|
|
|
977
|
|
00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:18,000
|
|
that would more or less
|
|
|
|
978
|
|
00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:20,000
|
|
be more or less only a variant
|
|
|
|
979
|
|
00:33:20,000 --> 00:33:22,000
|
|
that can be solved either via
|
|
|
|
980
|
|
00:33:22,000 --> 00:33:24,000
|
|
lockfile analytics or
|
|
|
|
981
|
|
00:33:24,000 --> 00:33:26,000
|
|
but you switch
|
|
|
|
982
|
|
00:33:26,000 --> 00:33:28,000
|
|
the analysis or rather
|
|
|
|
983
|
|
00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:30,000
|
|
the provision of the MP3
|
|
|
|
984
|
|
00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:32,000
|
|
via, for example, a PHP
|
|
|
|
985
|
|
00:33:32,000 --> 00:33:34,000
|
|
Redirector, which works
|
|
|
|
986
|
|
00:33:34,000 --> 00:33:36,000
|
|
virtually as a virtual
|
|
|
|
987
|
|
00:33:36,000 --> 00:33:38,000
|
|
directory and then
|
|
|
|
988
|
|
00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,000
|
|
takes the data in reception,
|
|
|
|
989
|
|
00:33:40,000 --> 00:33:42,000
|
|
takes the calls in reception, the requests
|
|
|
|
990
|
|
00:33:42,000 --> 00:33:44,000
|
|
and then also sends it
|
|
|
|
991
|
|
00:33:44,000 --> 00:33:46,000
|
|
to the Matomo API
|
|
|
|
992
|
|
00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:48,000
|
|
as a corresponding request.
|
|
|
|
993
|
|
00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:50,000
|
|
So it can be solved without any problems.
|
|
|
|
994
|
|
00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:52,000
|
|
We can talk about it again.
|
|
|
|
995
|
|
00:33:52,000 --> 00:33:54,000
|
|
Exactly, a proxy script, exactly.
|
|
|
|
996
|
|
00:33:56,000 --> 00:33:58,000
|
|
Exactly, something like that I would have also
|
|
|
|
997
|
|
00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:00,000
|
|
asked myself,
|
|
|
|
998
|
|
00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:02,000
|
|
which was not asked in the chat
|
|
|
|
999
|
|
00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:04,000
|
|
and the one problem
|
|
|
|
1000
|
|
00:34:04,000 --> 00:34:06,000
|
|
that I see a bit
|
|
|
|
1001
|
|
00:34:06,000 --> 00:34:08,000
|
|
with background tracking is,
|
|
|
|
1002
|
|
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:10,000
|
|
for example, if we have a very normal,
|
|
|
|
1003
|
|
00:34:10,000 --> 00:34:12,000
|
|
very simple PHP page, then
|
|
|
|
1004
|
|
00:34:12,000 --> 00:34:14,000
|
|
that would mean that every time this PHP
|
|
|
|
1005
|
|
00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:16,000
|
|
page is called,
|
|
|
|
1006
|
|
00:34:16,000 --> 00:34:18,000
|
|
a beginner is sent to the Matomo server
|
|
|
|
1007
|
|
00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:20,000
|
|
and the problem
|
|
|
|
1008
|
|
00:34:20,000 --> 00:34:22,000
|
|
is, in contrast to JavaScript
|
|
|
|
1009
|
|
00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:24,000
|
|
tracking, if you program it wrong,
|
|
|
|
1010
|
|
00:34:24,000 --> 00:34:26,000
|
|
that the background
|
|
|
|
1011
|
|
00:34:26,000 --> 00:34:28,000
|
|
server waits until it gets the answer
|
|
|
|
1012
|
|
00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:30,000
|
|
from Matomo and only then
|
|
|
|
1013
|
|
00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:32,000
|
|
sends the request to the user
|
|
|
|
1014
|
|
00:34:32,000 --> 00:34:34,000
|
|
and thus actually the
|
|
|
|
1015
|
|
00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:36,000
|
|
side call becomes a bit slower.
|
|
|
|
1016
|
|
00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:38,000
|
|
Yes, that's the standard error
|
|
|
|
1017
|
|
00:34:38,000 --> 00:34:40,000
|
|
problem on the topic, but
|
|
|
|
1018
|
|
00:34:40,000 --> 00:34:42,000
|
|
you can do the whole thing in this respect,
|
|
|
|
1019
|
|
00:34:42,000 --> 00:34:44,000
|
|
at least I do, that I
|
|
|
|
1020
|
|
00:34:44,000 --> 00:34:46,000
|
|
collect the data
|
|
|
|
1021
|
|
00:34:46,000 --> 00:34:48,000
|
|
within the standard process for the
|
|
|
|
1022
|
|
00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:50,000
|
|
page generation, but only
|
|
|
|
1023
|
|
00:34:50,000 --> 00:34:52,000
|
|
after, in the end,
|
|
|
|
1024
|
|
00:34:52,000 --> 00:34:54,000
|
|
yes, if Flash works,
|
|
|
|
1025
|
|
00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:56,000
|
|
that is, the entire HTML output
|
|
|
|
1026
|
|
00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:58,000
|
|
delivered to the customer
|
|
|
|
1027
|
|
00:34:58,000 --> 00:35:00,000
|
|
is then, in the end,
|
|
|
|
1028
|
|
00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,000
|
|
the last task of the
|
|
|
|
1029
|
|
00:35:02,000 --> 00:35:04,000
|
|
API Connect to Matomo.
|
|
|
|
1030
|
|
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:06,000
|
|
Variant 1, then I have, in the end,
|
|
|
|
1031
|
|
00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:08,000
|
|
the situation that the process
|
|
|
|
1032
|
|
00:35:08,000 --> 00:35:10,000
|
|
runs a little longer, but the
|
|
|
|
1033
|
|
00:35:10,000 --> 00:35:12,000
|
|
session to the browser is already
|
|
|
|
1034
|
|
00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:14,000
|
|
closed and, accordingly, the user
|
|
|
|
1035
|
|
00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:16,000
|
|
does not receive this request anymore.
|
|
|
|
1036
|
|
00:35:16,000 --> 00:35:18,000
|
|
The second variant is
|
|
|
|
1037
|
|
00:35:18,000 --> 00:35:20,000
|
|
to write all the tracking
|
|
|
|
1038
|
|
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:22,000
|
|
information into the database
|
|
|
|
1039
|
|
00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:24,000
|
|
and then play it
|
|
|
|
1040
|
|
00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:26,000
|
|
through, and then
|
|
|
|
1041
|
|
00:35:26,000 --> 00:35:28,000
|
|
take the data
|
|
|
|
1042
|
|
00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:30,000
|
|
from the database
|
|
|
|
1043
|
|
00:35:30,000 --> 00:35:32,000
|
|
in a separate process and then
|
|
|
|
1044
|
|
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:34,000
|
|
send it to Matomo.
|
|
|
|
1045
|
|
00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:36,000
|
|
Since I have to work with
|
|
|
|
1046
|
|
00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:38,000
|
|
a writing access anyway,
|
|
|
|
1047
|
|
00:35:38,000 --> 00:35:40,000
|
|
with the API Key, I can also
|
|
|
|
1048
|
|
00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:42,000
|
|
set the time of the access later.
|
|
|
|
1049
|
|
00:35:42,000 --> 00:35:44,000
|
|
Then I have a temporary delay,
|
|
|
|
1050
|
|
00:35:44,000 --> 00:35:46,000
|
|
but no real-time analysis at this point
|
|
|
|
1051
|
|
00:35:46,000 --> 00:35:48,000
|
|
in Matomo, but just 1-2 minutes
|
|
|
|
1052
|
|
00:35:48,000 --> 00:35:50,000
|
|
delayed, but that seems
|
|
|
|
1053
|
|
00:35:50,000 --> 00:35:52,000
|
|
to be a more elegant variant,
|
|
|
|
1054
|
|
00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:54,000
|
|
that I really log in, in the end,
|
|
|
|
1055
|
|
00:35:54,000 --> 00:35:56,000
|
|
only to a local MySQL database
|
|
|
|
1056
|
|
00:35:56,000 --> 00:35:58,000
|
|
or, as always, the database
|
|
|
|
1057
|
|
00:35:58,000 --> 00:36:00,000
|
|
just save and from there
|
|
|
|
1058
|
|
00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:02,000
|
|
get the whole thing out and
|
|
|
|
1059
|
|
00:36:02,000 --> 00:36:04,000
|
|
throw it to Matomo.
|
|
|
|
1060
|
|
00:36:04,000 --> 00:36:06,000
|
|
A solution that I then also
|
|
|
|
1061
|
|
00:36:06,000 --> 00:36:08,000
|
|
would have, which unfortunately goes
|
|
|
|
1062
|
|
00:36:08,000 --> 00:36:10,000
|
|
relatively badly in PHP, but in other
|
|
|
|
1063
|
|
00:36:10,000 --> 00:36:12,000
|
|
programming languages, for example,
|
|
|
|
1064
|
|
00:36:12,000 --> 00:36:14,000
|
|
it would also be a possibility
|
|
|
|
1065
|
|
00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:16,000
|
|
that the server has multiple processes
|
|
|
|
1066
|
|
00:36:16,000 --> 00:36:18,000
|
|
and then simply sending
|
|
|
|
1067
|
|
00:36:18,000 --> 00:36:20,000
|
|
the data to Matomo in a separate thread
|
|
|
|
1068
|
|
00:36:20,000 --> 00:36:22,000
|
|
and then really completely
|
|
|
|
1069
|
|
00:36:22,000 --> 00:36:24,000
|
|
independent of the application
|
|
|
|
1070
|
|
00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:26,000
|
|
of a user, because you don't have to wait,
|
|
|
|
1071
|
|
00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:28,000
|
|
because you need the information
|
|
|
|
1072
|
|
00:36:28,000 --> 00:36:30,000
|
|
not to be able to send the user
|
|
|
|
1073
|
|
00:36:30,000 --> 00:36:32,000
|
|
his data. But you can do the same
|
|
|
|
1074
|
|
00:36:32,000 --> 00:36:34,000
|
|
in PHP, I can also just
|
|
|
|
1075
|
|
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:36,000
|
|
load a thread.
|
|
|
|
1076
|
|
00:36:40,000 --> 00:36:42,000
|
|
So, as I said, if there are more
|
|
|
|
1077
|
|
00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:44,000
|
|
questions, feel free to contact
|
|
|
|
1078
|
|
00:36:44,000 --> 00:36:46,000
|
|
me at any time, linked in Facebook
|
|
|
|
1079
|
|
00:36:46,000 --> 00:36:48,000
|
|
or my website itself,
|
|
|
|
1080
|
|
00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:50,000
|
|
also on my website, book an appointment
|
|
|
|
1081
|
|
00:36:50,000 --> 00:36:52,000
|
|
for a meeting, then we can
|
|
|
|
1082
|
|
00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:54,000
|
|
like to see your individual needs.
|
|
|
|
1083
|
|
00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:00,000
|
|
Otherwise, if there are no more questions,
|
|
|
|
1084
|
|
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:02,000
|
|
then it comes to an end.
|
|
|
|
1085
|
|
00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:04,000
|
|
I can briefly announce
|
|
|
|
1086
|
|
00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:06,000
|
|
what happens at 11 o'clock.
|
|
|
|
1087
|
|
00:37:06,000 --> 00:37:08,000
|
|
At 11 o'clock we have two events again.
|
|
|
|
1088
|
|
00:37:08,000 --> 00:37:10,000
|
|
On the one hand, you can
|
|
|
|
1089
|
|
00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:12,000
|
|
change to live stream room 1,
|
|
|
|
1090
|
|
00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:14,000
|
|
where Jörg Paul will talk about it,
|
|
|
|
1091
|
|
00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:16,000
|
|
in a very, very large
|
|
|
|
1092
|
|
00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:18,000
|
|
Matomo instance,
|
|
|
|
1093
|
|
00:37:18,000 --> 00:37:20,000
|
|
from the point of view
|
|
|
|
1094
|
|
00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:22,000
|
|
of the Swedish tax agency
|
|
|
|
1095
|
|
00:37:22,000 --> 00:37:24,000
|
|
or something like that.
|
|
|
|
1096
|
|
00:37:24,000 --> 00:37:26,000
|
|
So really Matomo instances,
|
|
|
|
1097
|
|
00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:28,000
|
|
which get millions of pages a month,
|
|
|
|
1098
|
|
00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:30,000
|
|
how you can still handle it
|
|
|
|
1099
|
|
00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:32,000
|
|
on the server side,
|
|
|
|
1100
|
|
00:37:32,000 --> 00:37:34,000
|
|
that you can do the load.
|
|
|
|
1101
|
|
00:37:34,000 --> 00:37:36,000
|
|
Or you can change to
|
|
|
|
1102
|
|
00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:38,000
|
|
the interactive workshop
|
|
|
|
1103
|
|
00:37:38,000 --> 00:37:40,000
|
|
of Thomas Zeithammel
|
|
|
|
1104
|
|
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,000
|
|
in the workshop room.
|
|
|
|
1105
|
|
00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:44,000
|
|
Then it goes on in German
|
|
|
|
1106
|
|
00:37:44,000 --> 00:37:46,000
|
|
and he can talk about how to use Matomo
|
|
|
|
1107
|
|
00:37:46,000 --> 00:37:48,000
|
|
properly for such engine optimization.
|
|
|
|
1108
|
|
00:37:48,000 --> 00:37:50,000
|
|
That would be the two possibilities
|
|
|
|
1109
|
|
00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:52,000
|
|
at 11 o'clock.
|
|
|
|
1110
|
|
00:37:52,000 --> 00:37:54,000
|
|
Otherwise, thank you, Joachim,
|
|
|
|
1111
|
|
00:37:54,000 --> 00:37:56,000
|
|
for the nice lecture.
|
|
|
|
1112
|
|
00:37:56,000 --> 00:37:58,000
|
|
My pleasure.
|
|
|
|
1113
|
|
00:37:58,000 --> 00:38:12,000
|
|
Have fun with Matomo.
|
|
|